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Minimalism and Experimentalism in the
Administrative State
CHARLES F. SABEL & WILLIAM H. SIMON*
This Article identifies and appraises the two most promising alternatives to
the “command-and-control” style of public administration that was dominant
from the New Deal to the 1980s but is now in disfavor. The first—minimalism—
emphasizes public interventions that incorporate market concepts and practices
while also centralizing and minimizing administrative discretion. The second—
experimentalism—emphasizes interventions in which the central government
affords broad discretion to local administrative units but measures and assesses
their performance in ways designed to induce continuous learning and revision
of standards. Minimalism has been prominent in legal scholarship and in the
policy discourse of recent presidential administrations, but its practical impact
has been surprisingly limited. By contrast, experimentalism, which has had a
lower profile in academic and public discussion, has visibly influenced a broad
range of critical policy initiatives in the United States and abroad. Indeed, key
initiatives of the Obama Administration, including the Food Safety Moderniza-
tion Act and the Race to the Top education program, are virtually unintelligible
from any other perspective. We argue that, in practice, minimalism suffers from
an excessive preoccupation with static efficiency norms and price signals, and
from insufficient attention to learning and “weak signals” of risk and opportu-
nity. Experimentalist intervention is a more promising approach in the growing
realm of policy challenges characterized by uncertainty about both the defini-
tion of the relevant problems and the solutions.
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INTRODUCTION
The administrative style that characterized American public law from the
New Deal to the 1980s has been out of favor in recent years. This style,
pejoratively called command and control, is identified with rule-bound bureau-
cracy and deference to ineffable expertise. The efforts of recent years to escape
the limits of command-and-control administration have taken diverse forms,
and most remain controversial. In this Article, we suggest that these efforts can
be understood in terms of two broad models of public intervention, and we
assess their advantages relative to each other and to command-and-control
administration.
The first model can be called minimalism. The term is associated with Cass
Sunstein,1 but it usefully connotes the understanding of administration in a
broad range of legal scholarship, including especially the influential work of
Bruce Ackerman and Jerry Mashaw.2 This model seeks to ground policy design
1. See Robert Kuttner, The Radical Minimalist, AM. PROSPECT, Apr. 2009, at 28.
2. See, for example, BRUCE ACKERMAN & ANNE ALSTOTT, THE STAKEHOLDER SOCIETY (1999), present-
ing a proprosal for comprehensive reform of the welfare system, and JERRY L. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC
JUSTICE: MANAGING SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY CLAIMS (1983), for an analysis of the relation of
bureaucracy and adjudication in a key welfare program. We focus on the parallels among Sunstein,
Ackerman, and Mashaw in their treatment of administrative policy implementation. In the sphere of
constitutional adjudication, Ackerman rejects Sunstein’s minimalism. See Bruce Ackerman, The Living
Constitution, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1737, 1801–02 (2007).
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in economic concepts and market practices, and to minimize frontline administra-
tive discretion and popular participation in administration. Its key normative
reference points are efficiency and consistency. It favors cost–benefit analysis
for elite bureaucrats and restrictive rules for lower tier ones. Instead of directive
regulations, it prescribes regimes of marketable duties, such as emissions
permits, or marketable rights, such as welfare vouchers. Where people are prone
to make bad choices, it urges “nudges”—providing information or making
provisional choices from which the beneficiary can opt out—rather than manda-
tory rules.
We call the second model experimentalism, though it bears a strong resem-
blance to what others call “new governance” or “responsive regulation.” Experi-
mentalism has been influenced by both management theory and democratic
ideals, especially as the two converge in John Dewey’s idea of democratic
experimentalism.3 Its governing norm in institutional design is reliability—the
capacity for learning and adaptation. In experimentalist regimes, central institu-
tions give autonomy to local ones to pursue generally declared goals. The center
then monitors local performance, pools information in disciplined comparisons,
and creates pressures and opportunities for continuous improvement at all
levels. The regimes’ distinctive mechanisms for achieving both learning and
coordination emphasize deliberative engagement among officials and stakehold-
ers.
Our analysis highlights and explains a fundamental policy reorientation along
experimentalist lines in the United States, the European Union, and elsewhere
since the 1990s. Minimalism has been influential in legal scholarship and
popular policy discourse, but its impact on actual policy design has been
surprisingly limited. President Obama frequently invoked minimalist ideas in
his campaign, and he appointed Cass Sunstein, a leading minimalist, as Adminis-
trator of the White House Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs.4 Yet the
Administration’s most important initiatives—in fiscal policy, bank solvency,
healthcare, food safety, education, and offshore oil drilling—have reflected
these ideas only occasionally or dimly. By contrast, experimentalism has had a
lower profile in legal scholarship and popular policy discourse, but its premises
are pervasively and saliently (if often imperfectly) manifested in recent regula-
tory and social-welfare initiatives here and abroad. Some of the Obama Adminis-
tration’s most important initiatives, including the Food Safety Modernization
3. See JOHN DEWEY, THE PUBLIC AND ITS PROBLEMS 203 (1927); Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel,
A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 267 (1998); see also IAN AYRES
& JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 4–7 (1992)
(discussing responsive regulation); Gráinne de Búrca & Joanne Scott, Introduction: New Governance,
Law and Constitutionalism, in LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND THE US 1, 2–3 (Gráinne de
Búrca & Joanne Scott eds., 2006) (defining the concept of new governance).
4. Sunstein and several other Obama appointees are associated with behavioral economics, the
scholarly underpinning of nudge strategies. Time magazine referred to these advisors as a “behavioral
dream team” that was trying to “transform the country.” See Michael Grunwald, How Obama Is Using
the Science of Change, TIME, Apr. 13, 2009, at 28, 29.
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Act5 and the Race to the Top education program,6 can only be understood in
experimentalist terms.
We argue that these developments reflect the fact that experimentalist regimes
are especially well suited for circumstances in which effective public interven-
tion requires local variation and adaptation to changing circumstances. The
central characteristic of these circumstances is “uncertainty” in Frank Knight’s
sense—contingency that cannot be known or calculated actuarially or with
formal rigor but can only be estimated impressionistically.7 In the realm of
uncertainty, policy aims cannot be extensively defined in advance of implemen-
tation; they have to be discovered in the course of problem solving. Yet the
characteristic minimalist interventions presuppose a strong distinction between
the enactment or elaboration of public goals and their administrative implemen-
tation.
On the other hand, experimentalist regimes depend on the controversial
premise that public administration can integrate frontline discretion and stake-
holder participation in a disciplined, accountable manner. Distrust of decentral-
ized discretion and participation leads some minimalists to reject experimentalist
reforms even in situations in which experimentalists regard them as most
promising.8 Although this concern can only be resolved in practice, we identify
some of the ways in which experimentalism responds to it.
In Part I, we defend our notion of minimalism as a heuristic that usefully
identifies influential premises of recent public-law scholarship, and we elaborate
its limitations as a guide to policy implementation in regulation and social
welfare. In Part II, we elaborate the experimentalist alternative and argue for its
comparative advantages in key policy spheres. We do not deny the value of
minimalist interventions in some contexts. However, we argue that key changes
in the configuration of the problems addressed by both regulatory and social-
welfare policy favor experimentalist intervention in many areas.
I. MINIMALISM AND ITS LIMITS
We begin by describing the convergent themes of minimalism and then
proceed to analyze its limitations. Minimalism tends to be preoccupied with
static efficiency and committed to simple rules. Its favored interventions are
thus not well adapted to problems that require continuous and highly local
adaptation. Yet such requirements characterize many salient emerging policy
areas. In regulatory fields such as industrial or product safety or non-point-
source pollution, the goal is to mitigate risks that cannot be effectively priced;
5. See FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 111-353, 124 Stat. 3885 (2011) (to be
codified in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).
6. See U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., RACE TO THE TOP PROGRAM: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (2009), available at
http://www2.ed.gov/programs/racetothetop/executive-summary.pdf.
7. See FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT 19–20, 197–232 (1921).
8. See, e.g., David A. Super, Laboratories of Destitution: Democratic Experimentalism and the
Failure of Antipoverty Law, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 541, 541 (2008).
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appropriate intervention depends on changing technology and local contingen-
cies that cannot be distilled into simple and stable rules. Similarly, social-
welfare policy is less focused than it was in the past on identifying and
compensating people unable to work and more focused on providing people
with the skills and accommodations they need to cope with volatile economic
circumstances. The efficacy of these efforts often depends on complex customi-
zation of services, which is jeopardized by the homogenizing tendencies of both
markets and rule-driven administration.
A. GENERAL THEMES
Minimalism expresses disillusionment with the New Deal practice of vast
and vague delegation of authority to expert bureaucratic agencies. At the top,
the problem is that, because legislative specification generates excessively rigid
instructions and invites rent seeking by special interests, statutes must afford
discretion to administrators. At the bottom, the problem is the difficulty of
controlling the inevitable discretion of the “street level bureaucrats”—welfare
caseworkers, police officers on the beat, classroom teachers—who make on-the-
spot, face-to-face decisions that often determine the life chances of citizens.9
Minimalism also reflects disillusionment with the more ambitious claims
among liberals in the 1960s for participatory democracy. Ackerman emphasizes
that people have limited time and energy for politics except in times of crisis.10
Moreover, Sunstein adds, popular deliberation is not all it’s cracked up to be by
Utopian democrats. Serious disadvantages arise from tendencies, on the one
hand, toward unreflective conformity (“groupthink”) and, on the other, toward
unreflective tendentiousness (“group polarization”). Both phenomena are miti-
gated in decision-making processes that, instead of striving for deliberative
agreement, impersonally aggregate individual views.11 The minimalists believe
in the possibility of meaningful public-regarding deliberation by officials and
citizens, but democracy for them is mostly indirect. It takes place through
electoral representation rather than popular participation.
The minimalists look to economics for norms and practices that obviate
official discretion. The core economic norm is efficiency, which prescribes that
resources be invested so that at the margin their return is equal and that duties
9. See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR 38–57 (1981); MASHAW,
supra note 2, at 49–78.
10. Ackerman makes an exception for “constitutional moments” of heightened popular mobilization
and deliberation. See Ackerman, supra note 2, at 1763, 1810–11. He is also open to the idea of
occasional referenda on specific issues, and he likes the idea of quadrennial “deliberation days” during
which citizens can discuss and make recommendations on key issues to elected leaders. See BRUCE
ACKERMAN & JAMES S. FISHKIN, DELIBERATION DAY 3–5 (2004). However, he uses the constitutional-
moment idea more to explain the authority of past events than to inspire mobilization over current
issues. And he sees direct deliberation as rare and as engaging issues only selectively or at a high level
of abstraction.
11. See Cass R. Sunstein, Group Judgments: Statistical Means, Deliberation, and Information
Markets, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 965, 1004–06 (2005).
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be assigned to those who can perform them most cheaply. Basic economics
suggests that standard markets will achieve both tasks in the presence of certain
preconditions. The minimalists insist that there is nothing inherently conserva-
tive about such ideas so long as we take account of the ways in which the
preconditions to market efficiency are absent (and so long as efficiency is not
permitted to displace distributive and dignitary values).12
The minimalists would constrain policymakers at the top through rigorous
cost–benefit analysis. They support the presidential orders that have required
agencies to engage in cost–benefit analysis before promulgating rules (though
they deplore the tendentious misuse of such analysis in the service of political
goals). They have drawn on and contributed to a large body of literature that
tries to give structure to such analysis, in particular by showing how regulatory
benefits such as greater health, longer life, and lower mortality can be taken into
account systematically.13
In welfare programs, they propose a “social-cost accounting” that balances
the benefits of individualized treatment and adjudicatory process against its
costs. The availability of trial-type hearings should be weighed against the
magnitude of the cost of wrongful deprivation of the benefit in question. In
setting substantive standards, administrators should choose between rigid rules
and contextual standards so as to maximize the social benefits of “transpar-
ency,” “accessibility” (ease of application), and “congruence” (with underlying
purposes).14
At the level of implementation, the minimalists have a preference that, if
feasible, regulatory programs take a form that complements or induces markets.
The core examples are tradeable emissions permits and school or housing
vouchers. Reforms of this kind promise two benefits. First, they incorporate the
optimizing tendencies of markets. Second, they reduce the number and complex-
ity of the programs’ norms, thus cabining discretion.
Cap-and-trade regimes respond to defects in the more command-and-control
approach of the Clean Air Act. Under the Act, polluters have been obligated to
reduce emissions to the level of the “best available” mitigation technology.
Such abatement is inefficient, however, because it imposes uniform duties that
disregard large variations in the compliance costs of emitters. Moreover, deter-
mining the best available mitigation technology for myriad highly technical
functions is just the sort of task to which bureaucracies are unsuited, especially
because the information needed for sound decisions is held by private firms
12. See Bruce A. Ackerman, Foreword: Law in an Activist State, 92 YALE L.J. 1083, 1119 (1983).
13. See, e.g., MATTHEW D. ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF COST–BENEFIT ANALYSIS
2–8 (2006); RICHARD L. REVESZ & MICHAEL A. LIVERMORE, RETAKING RATIONALITY: HOW COST–BENEFIT
ANALYSIS CAN BETTER PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT AND OUR HEALTH 131–43 (2008); CASS R. SUNSTEIN,
RISK AND REASON: SAFETY, LAW, AND THE ENVIRONMENT, at x–xii (2002).
14. See Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65, 66 (1983);
Jerry L. Mashaw, Administrative Due Process as Social-Cost Accounting, 9 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1423,
1435–36 (1981).
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with many incentives to withhold it from regulators.
Instead of attempting to define feasible technical solutions, the minimalists
propose that the regulator issue allowances authorizing emissions of specified
pollutants in socially acceptable aggregate amounts and then compel emitters to
buy such permits in a market in which they can be freely traded. Firms that can
abate emissions cheaply do so, and those with high costs buy the allowances.
The market thus allocates the burden of a prescribed degree of abatement to the
cheapest cost avoiders with a precision that no bureaucracy could achieve
directly.15
In social welfare, the minimalists support school and housing vouchers with
which beneficiaries choose for themselves from among a range of providers
certified as meeting basic general standards. The beneficiary receives a voucher
that she can exchange for housing or schooling, and the chosen provider, upon
surrendering the voucher, receives a specified payment from the government. As
emissions permits contribute to optimization on the cost side by allocating
duties to the cheapest cost avoider, vouchers do so on the benefit side by
providing the beneficiary with the housing or schooling she deems most valu-
able. Moreover, in principle, vouchers put pressure on providers that make them
more accountable to beneficiaries. If the beneficiaries are not satisfied, they go
elsewhere, and the providers lose the payments.16
At their most ambitious, minimalists would replace much of the existing
welfare state with what Ackerman and Anne Alstott call a “stakeholder” regime
in which each citizen, upon turning eighteen, receives a substantial, one-time
endowment that can be used in whatever ways she decides—“to start a business
or pay for more education, to buy a house or raise a family or save for the
future.” The goal of this universal voucher is to provide “a fair starting point for
all” while protecting individuals from bureaucratic interference and eliminating
the work-disincentive effects of means testing. “Stakeholders are free . . .
[to make their own decisions, but their] triumphs and blunders are their own.”17
Where markets already exist and the problem is people’s limited capacity for
effective choice, Sunstein has urged that interventions should often be limited to
nudges designed narrowly to compensate for the relevant cognitive impair-
ments. These microinterventions involve altering a default rule or attending to
“choice architecture” by providing information to consumers. So, for example,
if people appear to be saving too little (as indicated by postretirement poverty or
expressions of regret), the solution is not to mandate savings, but to change the
default rule for tax-subsidized, employer-run savings plans. The original default
15. See Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Comment, Reforming Environmental Law, 37
STAN. L. REV. 1333, 1342–45 (1985).
16. See Goodwin Liu, Education, Equality, and National Citizenship, 116 YALE L.J. 330, 403 (2006).
17. ACKERMAN & ALSTOTT, supra note 2, at 5; see also MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & JERRY L. MASHAW, TRUE
SECURITY: RETHINKING AMERICAN SOCIAL INSURANCE 150–51 (1999) (proposing national programs of
“cash income replacements or supplements, mandated individual savings, and certain forms of stop-loss
insurance” that avoid “highly individualized discretion and decisionmaking”).
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rule provided that the employer direct a portion of compensation to savings if
the employee requested; the new rule would require the employer to contribute
to savings unless the employee requests otherwise. By influencing without
preempting choice, nudges protect impaired choosers from their mistakes, while
maximizing autonomy and avoiding error costs by leaving a significant range
for choice.18
Where administrative judgments are unavoidable, the minimalists prefer to
limit discretion with clear and easily monitored rules. A key example here is the
“vocational” determination in the Social Security disability programs. Eligibil-
ity requires a finding that the applicant is incapable of performing any jobs that
exist in significant numbers. For decades, the decisions were made on the basis
of all-things-considered judgments. But “[o]ne disability examiner’s ‘broken
down manual laborer’ is another’s ‘malingerer.’”19 The system of appeals to
administrative law judges simply reproduced the problem at a second level. The
minimalist solution is a grid that dictates a conclusion on the basis of a series of
straightforward findings about age, education, physical capacity, and work
experience. The problem of street-level bureaucracy is avoided by keeping the
bureaucrats off the streets.20
B. LIMITATIONS: REGULATION
We turn now to our reservations about minimalism, beginning with the
minimalist treatment of regulation.
1. The Efficiency Perspective
The main preoccupation of minimalist regulatory scholarship is efficiency or
optimization. Yet efficiency is not the only, and often not the most important,
regulatory value. Management theorists often espouse a different value, which
they suggest is sometimes in tension with efficiency. Reliability is one name for
this norm. It connotes a capacity for learning and innovation, or more specifi-
cally, for prompt recognition of and adaptation to changing threats and opportu-
nities.21
We do not doubt that the minimalists would acknowledge the importance of
18. See RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH,
WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 9–11 (2008). Influenced by Sunstein, President Obama proposed to mandate
that large employers automatically enroll employees in retirement savings programs, and such a
requirement was incorporated in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148,
§ 1511, 124 Stat. 119, 252 (2010) (to be codified at 29 U.S.C. § 218).
19. Mashaw, supra note 14, at 1436.
20. See A. I. Ogus, Bureaucrats as Institutional Heroes, 7 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 309, 313 (1987).
Summarizing Mashaw’s view, A. I. Ogus writes, “Bureaucratic rationality involves accurate and
cost-effective implementation of centrally determined goals; it avoids direct confrontations with the
claimant, concentrating instead on the application of detailed rules and guidelines and with internal
systems of management and control to ensure consistency.” Id. at 311.
21. See Martin Landau & Donald Chisholm, The Arrogance of Optimism: Notes on Failure-
Avoidance Management, 3 J. CONTINGENCIES & CRISIS MGMT. 67, 67 (1995).
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reliability or that reliability could be subsumed under a thick definition of
efficiency. However, as the efficiency idea is thickened to embrace reliability
concerns, it loses some of the precision and rigor that minimalists see as its core
virtues. In practice, the minimalists seem to deploy a static conception of
efficiency that risks slighting reliability concerns.
Reliability entails responsiveness, not just to strong signals like prices but
also to weak signals such as small anomalies or deviances. Weak signals may
not be visible in market prices. They differ from prices and other strong signals
in being more numerous and diverse, and in requiring deliberative consideration
and complex judgment. Consider an incident at the Davis–Besse nuclear power
plant near Toledo, Ohio in the early 2000s. Maintenance personnel found rust
particles “‘mysteriously clogging’” the air-conditioning and water filters. They
had to replace the filters every two days. The industry standard for replacing
such filters was two months, although the workers involved did not know this.
After every-other-day replacements went on for two years, different personnel
discovered that a metal liner built to contain radioactive material had corroded
from its original six-and-one-half-inch thickness to about one-half inch. The
corrosion had been generating the rust particles. Karl Weick and Kathleen
Sutcliffe assert:
The rust accumulation was a weak signal of plantwide problems that might
have been detected sooner had information about industrywide experience
been disseminated more thoroughly, had local personnel compared this experi-
ence with filter replacement in other parts of the facility, had the purchasing
department questioned the large orders for filter replacements, or simply if
people had started asking around about whether replacement every forty-eight
hours seemed out of line.22
The best known examples of organizations focused on detecting and assess-
ing weak signals are “high reliability” organizations in areas such as aviation or
energy production, in which operational breakdown threatens catastrophe, and
“lean production” manufacturing firms, in which competitive pressures arising
from short product cycles and customer demand for specialized features call for
the kind of discipline that the threat of catastrophe imposes on high-reliability
organizations. Perhaps the most influential examples have been the U.S. Navy’s
nuclear submarine program and the product-development and manufacturing
model associated with Toyota.23
22. KARL E. WEICK & KATHLEEN M. SUTCLIFFE, MANAGING THE UNEXPECTED: RESILIENT PERFORMANCE
IN AN AGE OF UNCERTAINTY 46 (2d ed. 2007).
23. See Charles F. Sabel, A Real-Time Revolution in Routines, in THE FIRM AS A COLLABORATIVE
COMMUNITY: RECONSTRUCTING TRUST IN THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY 106, 122 (Charles Heckscher & Paul
S. Adler eds., 2006). See generally STEVEN J. SPEAR, CHASING THE RABBIT: HOW MARKET LEADERS
OUTDISTANCE THE COMPETITION AND HOW GREAT COMPANIES CAN CATCH UP AND WIN (2008) (examining
the successful organizational cultures of Toyota and the U.S. Navy).
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The Navy’s nuclear propulsion program developed an ethos and a set of
practices that treated even minor, unexpected observations as symptoms of
potential systemic malfunction calling for inquiry and possibly reform. The
Toyota Production System deliberately stresses its processes (for example, by
“just-in-time” parts delivery that eliminates buffer inventory stocks) so that
errors will surface quickly. It eliminates end-of-the-line rework departments in
favor of practices that stop the line when defects are discovered and require that
the “root cause” of the problem be diagnosed and remedied before production
resumes.24
Although there is no tension in principle between efficiency and reliability,
many have observed that efficiency rhetoric can, in practice, inhibit the pursuit
of reliability.
First, efficiency is associated with a preference for simple and few norms and
hence crude categories. Such preferences encourage a tendency to “normalize
the unexpected,” to reframe deviant observations in ways that assimilate them
to previous understanding, rather than to treat them as opportunities to revise
such understanding. Burn marks on the Challenger space shuttle and the rust
particles at the Davis–Besse nuclear plant were initially perceived as anomalies
but, in the absence of pressure to focus on them, were reconceived as normal.
Arguing against “simplification,” Weick and Sutcliffe assert, “[T]he diagnostic
value of weak signals is lost when . . . details are lumped into crude, general
categories.” They continue, “Categories may improve coordination [that is,
static efficiency], but they harm detection of events not seen before.”25
Second, the efficiency view is associated with a preoccupation with short-
term cost minimization. The pursuit of reliability requires incurring immediate
and measurable costs in the hope of speculative future benefits. Those who have
been taught to focus on efficiency sometimes find this hard to do. Reporting on
the transformation of nuclear-power safety in the 1990s, Joseph Rees writes that
under the old regime, “maximizing the output of electricity meant fixing the
reactor after it breaks.” Conventionally trained managers resisted supporting
“operating experience review” engineers who sought to prevent all breakdowns
because the benefits of their work could not be measured. The managers were
uncomfortable with committing resources to “solve problems that haven’t even
occurred yet.”26 Books on Toyota-style organization assert incessantly that,
although optimization and reliability ultimately go together, managers need to
defer or sublimate optimization concerns and focus on reliability to achieve
24. See generally Sabel, supra note 23, at 119–26 (discussing high-reliability organizations).
25. WEICK & SUTCLIFFE, supra note 22, at 64; see also DIANE VAUGHAN, THE CHALLENGER LAUNCH
DECISION: RISKY TECHNOLOGY, CULTURE, AND DEVIANCE AT NASA 77–118 (1996) (attributing the Chal-
lenger explosion in part to a cultural tendency toward “normalization of deviance” that minimizes weak
signals of problems).
26. JOSEPH V. REES, HOSTAGES OF EACH OTHER: THE TRANSFORMATION OF NUCLEAR SAFETY SINCE THREE
MILE ISLAND 130–31 (1994).
62 [Vol. 100:53THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
success.27
When markets fail, it is sometimes more important for regulation to strive to
induce reliability than efficiency (in the static, cost-minimization sense that the
term often connotes). The regulators need to develop capacities for learning and
adaptation in their own systems, and they need to encourage the firms they
oversee to cultivate such capacities in a manner that gives appropriate weight to
relevant public values.28
When goals are framed in terms of catastrophe avoidance (as with high-
reliability organizations), the need for reliability is obvious, but reliability
concerns are also potentially relevant when the relevant harms are more diffuse
and frequent. Criminal justice is an important borderline case. Minimalism
resonates with the law-and-economics perspective that directs attention to
“getting prices right” by correctly calculating penalties. This view emphasizes
cost–benefit analysis to approximate penalties to the social value of the relevant
harm (adjusted to reflect probability of apprehension and conviction). A compet-
ing perspective argues for more attention to and resources for prevention. In this
latter view, we should have fewer prisons and more police, and we should
allocate policing strategically. We can do this by generating visible police
presence in areas where crime is likely, by strictly enforcing against small
offenses (for example, “quality-of-life” offenses) that lead to larger ones, or by
targeting especially dangerous individuals or groups. The focus here is not on
prices or penalties but on weak signals from conditions that are not grave in
themselves but are symptomatic of danger. The approach calls for collecting
information and coordinating the efforts of public agencies and private organiza-
tions to interpret that information and to rapidly adjust responses to it.
The cost–benefit approach dominated discussions of criminal justice in the
27. See MASAAKI IMAI, KAIZEN: THE KEY TO JAPAN’S COMPETITIVE SUCCESS 49–50 (1986) (“Japanese
managers have found that seeking improvement for improvement’s sake[] is the surest way to
strengthen their companies’ overall competitiveness. If you take care of the quality, the profits will take
care of themselves.”); RAJAN SURI, QUICK RESPONSE MANUFACTURING: A COMPANYWIDE APPROACH TO
REDUCING LEAD TIMES 56 (1998) (“[T]he manufacturing world learned [from Japanese firms] that . . .
[i]f one focused on improving quality, then cost competitiveness would follow.”).
Neoclassical economics encourages the hope that, if the administrator gets the prices right, the
regulated firms will spontaneously develop whatever skills are necessary to succeed in the reoptimized
market. But other economic learning shows that we cannot assume that this will happen. Key actors
may be able to externalize the costs imposed by the regulator. Notably, corporate agents can shift costs
to shareholders, and shareholders, with limited liability, can shift them back to the public. Moreover, as
we will illustrate shortly, the learning that occurs through the analysis of weak signals has a public-
good quality. It is valuable to others, but it is usually not feasible for the discoverer to charge for it.
(Information comes in small pieces of initially uncertain value, and it becomes obsolete quickly.) Under
the circumstances, there is a substantial probability that, without further public intervention, private
investment in the capacity to detect and interpret weak signals will be suboptimal.
28. Some analyses of the financial crisis that began in 2007 associate regulatory failure with a
preoccupation with static efficiency at the expense of reliability. See, e.g., FIN. SERVS. AUTH., THE
TURNER REVIEW: A REGULATORY RESPONSE TO THE GLOBAL BANKING CRISIS 40–42 (2009). See generally
William H. Simon, Optimization and Its Discontents in Regulatory Design: Bank Regulation as an
Example, 4 REG. & GOVERNANCE 3 (2010) (contrasting “the optimization and reliability perspectives”).
2011] 63ADMINISTRATIVE MINIMALISM & EXPERIMENTALISM
1980s and 1990s. It was, however, challenged in the 1990s by proposals for
“community policing” regimes, which were adopted with occasional success in
many cities.29 September 11, 2001 made this weak signal reliability perspective
more salient. Because it involved catastrophic harm, it shifted attention to
prevention, and because the critical performance failures involved sharing and
analysis of ambiguous information, initiatives emphasized the importance of the
capacity for adaptive response rather than for efficient penalty calibration.30
2. Minimalist Intervention
Both of the minimalists’ favorite regulatory tools—cost–benefit analysis and
tradable emissions permits—reflect a preoccupation with static efficiency. Al-
though both tools are valuable, they are not as valuable as the minimalists
suggest, and their efforts may have obscured or distracted attention from some
important issues.
a. Cost–Benefit Analysis. Any sensible regulatory proposal should consider
costs. And it is often a valuable heuristic exercise to compare the costs with the
benefits of a particular proposal or the relative return on public expenditures
from different proposals, even if the exercise requires controversial and specula-
tive estimations. It is useful to know that the cost per life saved from the EPA’s
trihalomethane drinking water standard is $200,000, while the cost per life
saved from its 1,2-Dichloropropane standard is $653 million.31 The comparison,
even if plausibly calculated, does not establish that either standard is mistaken,
but it gives a reason to revisit both.
Nevertheless, the potential value of cost–benefit analysis is limited by its
focus, at least in practice, on static factors as opposed to the capacity for
learning and adaptation. First, the proponents have been preoccupied with
methodological issues concerning the estimation of benefits (for example, the
value of a life or of different kinds of lives, or the right discount rate for future
lives), whereas, in practice, conclusions will often be dominated by estimates of
future costs, which will necessarily be highly speculative. Richard Revesz and
Michael Livermore note a persistent tendency to underestimate cost-saving
innovation and overestimate costs. They give examples of estimates that proved
to be wrong by “several orders of magnitude.”32 Methodological rigor makes
only a slight contribution when the inputs are so soft.
Second, the proponents tend to defend cost–benefit analysis in the abstract
without much attention to how it might be institutionalized.33 The value of
29. See ARCHON FUNG, EMPOWERED PARTICIPATION: REINVENTING URBAN DEMOCRACY 63–68, 173–210
(2004).
30. See Daniel Richman, The Right Fight, BOS. REV., Dec. 2004–Jan. 2005, at 6, 6.
31. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 13, at 30–31 tbl.2.1.
32. See REVESZ & LIVERMORE, supra note 13, at 135.
33. An important exception on which we rely here is outlined in Nicholas Bagley & Richard L.
Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory State, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1260, 1312–29 (2006).
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cost–benefit analysis as an intellectual discipline does not imply any particular
conclusions about institutional structure. To the extent that analysis involves
comparison of costs and benefits across different regulations and agencies, it
suggests a central role for standardizing methodology and collecting and dissemi-
nating data, but this central role could be a subordinate one performed without
significant loss of authority to the agencies. Or it could involve a substantive
oversight role played with varying degrees of strictness. The latter approach
raises difficult questions as to how central administrators can absorb and
coherently assess the large volume of information pertinent to the federal
regulatory output. The former approach involves a more modest role for cost–
benefit analysis than its centrality in the minimalist literature implies.34
In practice, the principal effect of cost–benefit analysis in the federal govern-
ment in recent years seems to have been to rationalize a shift in authority from
the agencies to the White House. This shift has at least occasionally involved
heavy-handed, ad hoc, central intervention, sometimes rationalized by tenden-
tious and ideologically driven estimations of costs and benefits. It also appears
to have involved significant diminution in the transparency of the regulatory
process because the White House regulatory offices are less transparent than the
agencies. The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, which oversees
cost–benefit review, is not subject to judicial review under the Administrative
Procedure Act, and it “has a long and well-documented history of secrecy.”35
No doubt the minimalists regret these developments, which are not entailed by
cost–benefit analysis in principle. But the developments show the limitations of
a literature preoccupied with analytical methodology rather than institutionaliza-
tion.
Third, as practiced, cost–benefit analysis is associated with the enactment or
rule-making stage of policy formulation. For many problems, relevant informa-
tion will be too scarce and ambiguous to support useful formal analysis at this
stage. In these situations, interventions should be designed in part to produce
information that will guide adaptation, and, sometimes, they may eventually
produce the kind of information that makes formal cost–benefit analysis plau-
sible. If so, the important occasions for cost–benefit analysis will occur after the
program is underway. Yet the minimalists seem to accept the current practice
that confines it to the point of initiation.36
b. Cap-and-Trade. The most developed regulatory proposal in the minimalist
literature is the cap-and-trade emissions permit system, which epitomizes the
minimalists’ virtues of static efficiency (allocating burdens to the cheapest cost
34. Bagley and Revesz take something like the modest position. Id. at 1313–14.
35. Id. at 1282–83, 1309.
36. See id. at 1264–68; Cass R. Sunstein, Adm’r, Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs, Address at
American University’s Washington College of Law Administrative Law Review Conference: Humaniz-
ing Cost–Benefit Analysis (Feb. 17, 2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/
omb/assets/inforeg/cost_benefit_analysis_02172010.pdf.
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avoider) and minimizing discretion.37 Emissions trading has proven successful
in a few programs involving modest numbers of large-scale industrial producers
and well-studied pollutants, especially lead from oil refiners and sulfur dioxide
from utilities and factories.38 The idea seems likely to prove valuable in other
contexts, perhaps at larger scales, but its range is more limited than the
minimalists suggest. In particular, four limitations should be noted.
First, the cap-and-trade approach only works with harms that can be effec-
tively measured.39 Although the environmental harms of air pollution cannot be
measured directly, they correlate sufficiently with the amount of emissions of
specific pollutants, and, for some sources and pollutants, we can measure that.
However, for most regulatory goals, we have no comparably powerful proxies.
Regulatory regimes are usually prophylactic; they are designed to minimize
risk. With food safety, occupational health and safety, or financial institution
soundness, for example, there is no single powerful indicator of risk. In such
situations, we are forced to rely on weak signals—a multifarious range of
indicators that require interpretation and complex judgment and do not lend
themselves to pricing.40
Second, even when adequate proxies are available, the information demands
of cap-and-trade remain large and sometimes disqualifying. The regulator still
has to set an aggregate quantity limit (or in the tax alternative, a price) for each
pollutant. Because the efficacy of the regime depends on this single number, the
stakes are extremely high. Yet both methodology and data for this determination
are likely to be incomplete and disputed. The regulator needs to estimate not
only the immediate effects of abatement of the target pollutant but also collat-
eral costs and benefits of behavior induced by the abatement incentives—costs,
for example, of unregulated but still harmful pollutants that might be substituted
for the regulated ones; benefits, for example, of unregulated but harmful
pollutants that might be abated by the same efforts required to abate the
37. See, e.g., Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 15, at 1341–42.
38. See NATHANIEL O. KEOHANE & SHEILA M. OLMSTEAD, MARKETS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 182–90
(2007); Richard G. Newell & Kristian Rogers, The Market-Based Lead Phasedown 1 (Res. for the
Future, Discussion Paper No. 03-37, 2003), available at http://www.rff.org/RFF/Documents/RFF-DP-03-
37.pdf. Another promising trading initiative is the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative undertaken by
ten mid-Atlantic and northeastern states. See REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, http://www.rggi.org
(last visited July 19, 2011).
39. See Cary Coglianese & David Lazer, Management-Based Regulation: Prescribing Private
Management To Achieve Public Goals, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 691, 725–26 (2003).
40. Of course, measurement needs to be economically as well as technically feasible. Moreover,
trading requires an infrastructure (for example, to identify owners and record trades) and entails
transaction costs. These prerequisites will limit the application of the model to actors of more than
minimal size or abatements of more than minimal social value. The thresholds are met with respect to
the kind of large power-generating and manufacturing facilities covered by current regimes. However,
to the extent that the relevant problems involve smaller, more diffuse activities, they may not be
covered. For example, the model seems unpromising for the increasingly salient problems of emissions
from “non-point sources” such as farm-water-pesticide runoff. See Bradley C. Karkkainen, Information
as Environmental Regulation: TRI and Performance Benchmarking, Precursor to a New Paradigm?, 89
GEO. L.J. 257, 264–67 & n.17 (2001).
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regulated ones. Moreover, while the market regime obviates determinations of
relative abatement costs among emitters, it requires knowledge of aggregate
costs. To determine the efficient price, we need to know the point at which
marginal aggregate costs equal marginal aggregate benefits. Yet such determina-
tions are notoriously difficult.
It is no surprise then that the few examples to date of operating cap-and-trade
systems include some spectacular examples of getting quantities, and hence
prices, wrong. In 2000, quantities proved too low to accommodate an unantici-
pated surge in demand in the South Coast Air Quality Management District
trading regime in California. Prices for nitrous oxide emissions soared from less
than $2,500 per ton in 1999 to $45,000 per ton in 2000.41 Another crisis
emerged with the inauguration of the European Union’s greenhouse-gas-
emissions trading regime. Allowance prices collapsed in 2006, when it became
apparent that the regulators had overestimated current business-as-usual emis-
sions, and thus set an aggregate target that was too high, resulting in the
distribution of too many allowances.42
It is true that market-simulating reforms like cap-and-trade will often require
less information and complex judgment than comparable command-and-control
regimes. However, this advantage comes at a cost.43 There is a risk that market
simulation will involve a sacrifice in flexibility, particularly in the capacity to
revise in response to new information. Part of the market simulation idea is to
induce private investment by creating marketable entitlements. Investors will
claim that they need and deserve some measure of stability with respect to the
key parameter of price or quantity. Thus, allowances may be good for several
years—often five in the EU—and can sometimes be “banked” for use beyond
that period.44 The regimes typically place limits on the ability of regulators to
dilute the value of the permits by new issuances before the end of a period.
Regulatory tightening is apt to trigger protest under any regime but, by encourag-
ing emitters to view the current limits as an entitlement for a fixed period,
cap-and-trade may exacerbate the problem.
The third limitation of market-simulating regimes is that, although they are
sensitive to variations in abatement costs among emitters, they are insensitive to
variations in abatement benefits across the localities where emissions occur. At
least in the paradigmatic model, there is a single price for emissions throughout
the system. Yet the harm that emissions cause usually varies locally with such
41. See Raul P. Lejano & Rei Hirose, Testing the Assumptions Behind Emissions Trading in
Non-Market Goods: The RECLAIM Program in Southern California, 8 ENVTL. SCI. & POL’Y 367,
373–74 & fig.4 (2005).
42. See Heather Timmons, Data Leaks Shake Up Carbon Trade, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 2006, at C1,
C8.
43. See KEOHANE & OLMSTEAD, supra note 38, at 164–68.
44. See Anthony Hobley & Peter Hawkes, GHG Emissions Trading Registries, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF
IMPLEMENTING THE KYOTO PROTOCOL MECHANISMS 127, 147 (David Freestone & Charlotte Streck eds.,
2005).
2011] 67ADMINISTRATIVE MINIMALISM & EXPERIMENTALISM
contingencies as population density, aggregate emissions levels, and land-use
patterns. The marginal harm in a heavily polluted urban area is often much
higher than in a sparsely populated area with low aggregate emission levels.
Moreover, market regimes may encourage the creation of “hot spots.” These
occur when polluters minimize compliance costs by clustering in low cost areas
(areas with low land costs and limited local taxes and regulation). When this
happens, pollution burdens concentrate in particular localities. It is possible that
these localities will disproportionately include low-income and otherwise disad-
vantaged people. The hot-spot problem does not apply to greenhouse gases
because their effect operates at the global level, and emissions from any point
contribute equally. However, for most pollutants, location matters.45
Trading regimes can address the localization problem by subdividing mar-
kets. Thus, in the South Coast Air Quality Management District, permits sell at
different prices in coastal and inland districts. Yet such subdivision multiplies
the number of judgments and the amount of information required.46
Fourth, it is not clear how powerful the incentives for the production and
dissemination of innovative technology created by trading systems will be. To
the extent that innovations take the form of major capital goods, especially with
45. Although the global nature of greenhouse-gas effects on temperatures exempts it from the
hot-spot problem, it creates a tragedy-of-the-commons problem. Only global efforts, or at least efforts
including all major emitting nations, are likely to be strongly effective. Yet it has proven difficult to
induce major emitters, especially India and China, to participate substantially. Two responses show the
limits of the market approach:
1. The Kyoto Protocol and other regimes allow emitters within the regime to earn credits by
subsidizing projects in nonparticipating countries that reduce emissions (or increase gas
absorption) beyond what would have happened in the absence of the project. A major
fraction of the reductions credited to Kyoto have involved such efforts.
2. Some observers propose a focus on negotiated deals for large infrastructure projects in
which rich countries trade economic benefits for developing-country commitments favor-
ing low-emission energy production (natural gas and nuclear power rather than coal and
oil).
A key point about both approaches is that they cannot operate primarily through self-adjusting price
signals and impersonal trading. They require complex administrative capacity. Failure to appreciate this
point accounts for the early disappointments of the Kyoto Clean Development Mechanism. It appears
that a large fraction of the credits certified under the regime involved abatements that would have
occurred without the regime or could have been induced at a much lower cost than the regime paid. A
core problem is that the regime has encouraged private institutional development that has outpaced the
development of public institutional capacity to restrain abuses. See Michael Wara, Is the Global Carbon
Market Working?, NATURE, Feb. 8, 2007, at 595, 595. See generally James Salzman & J.B. Ruhl,
Currencies and the Commodification of Environmental Law, 53 STAN. L. REV. 607 (2000) (discussing
the optimal architecture of environmental trading markets).
46. In their early proposal, Ackerman and Stewart proposed extensive subdivision. See Ackerman &
Stewart, supra note 15, at 1350. Jonathan Nash and Richard Revesz speculated on the possibility of a
massive computer program aggregating information about local climate effects that would continuously
generate local prices for emissions of controlled pollutants. See Jonathan Remy Nash & Richard L.
Revesz, Markets and Geography: Designing Marketable Permit Schemes To Control Local and
Regional Pollutants, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 569, 609–10 (2001). It seems ironic that a discussion that started
out with the goal of minimizing the information demands on regulators should lead to a proposal that
resembles nothing so much as Soviet central planning.
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patentable features, they will be marketed and adopted when likely to be
profitable. But many innovations take the form of incremental improvements or
involve adaptation of technologies to particular local conditions. Without public
efforts, small incremental improvements may not be disseminated because of
transaction costs. Moreover, technology may not be usable without significant
customization, and small and medium producers may lack access to necessary
technical assistance.47 It is possible that trade associations or business consul-
tants can fill this gap, but it is not inevitable. The example of the U.S.
Agricultural Extension Service shows that publicly subsidized technical assis-
tance may be needed to induce small- and medium-sized producers to adopt
socially desirable practices and to protect them from the competitive disadvan-
tages that they might suffer vis-à-vis larger producers as a result of regulations
requiring technologically complex responses.48
C. LIMITATIONS: SOCIAL WELFARE
The minimalist welfare program of nudges (manipulation of default rules and
choice architecture), norm simplification, and vouchers is likely to prove helpful
with respect to some problems. But the approach seems implausible or question
begging with respect to many of the most important problems. It is unrespon-
sive to some salient trends in welfare policy, and the most promising recent
innovations have taken a much different approach.
1. The Changing Policy Context
The New Deal welfare system was focused on cash transfers under categori-
cal rules. Its central programs were modeled on private insurance, and they
reflected an actuarial conception of risk. The basic reference point was a typical
worker: a male breadwinner working for forty years, after an initial period of
searching, in the same job or a succession of similar jobs in the same industry.
His career would be interrupted by spells of unemployment, but these spells
would correlate with systematically calculable phases of the business cycle. The
Social Security Act created programs of wage-related benefits for this worker
and his dependents during bouts of unemployment, after retirement, in case of
his disability, and for his surviving dependents after his death. A parallel
program of means-tested public-assistance benefits for people who could not
work and lacked sufficient employment history to qualify for social insurance
was expected to wither away as the economy recovered from the Depression
47. See ERIC VON HIPPEL, DEMOCRATIZING INNOVATION 67 (2005) (explaining that the costs of transfer-
ring even “fully developed process technology” to new settings can be high).
48. Atul Gawande has argued that in healthcare, “New laboratory science is not the key to saving
lives. The infant science of improving performance—of implementing our existing know-how—is.” A
new drug with a fraction of the effectiveness of his simple but counterintuitive surgery protocol would
have attracted a vast amount of private capital, but developing and demonstrating the “checklist”
required public support. See ATUL GAWANDE, BETTER: A SURGEON’S NOTES ON PERFORMANCE 242–43
(2007).
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and breadwinners built up their social insurance entitlements.
Of course, the public assistance programs did not wither away. The problems
that they addressed persisted and grew even in periods that approached full
employment. This basic development has required extensive rethinking of these
programs and their relation to the social insurance programs. An important body
of minimalist scholarship has struggled with this task.49 As we’ve noted, this
scholarship has sought to preserve the New Deal emphasis on standardized,
rule-defined cash benefits while broadening the scope of both the social insur-
ance and public assistance programs.
These efforts, however, have not taken full account of changes in the social
context that underlay the New Deal commitment to standardized, rule-defined
benefits, and they have largely ignored the most distinctive policy responses to
them. The key social changes concern increased diversity and volatility. The
distinction between labor-market participants and nonparticipants has eroded.
People whom the New Deal model considered normally outside the labor
market—the elderly, disabled, housewives, single mothers—are now thought to
have a right, a duty, or both to participate effectively. Long-term careers in the
same job or industry are less common; the skills that jobs demand vary more
widely and change more rapidly than before. Long-term marriage and two-
parent child rearing, which the New Deal took as normal, have diminished, and
family structures have become more diverse. The social backgrounds and
linguistic capacities of citizens vary increasingly. Some social problems, includ-
ing many involving mental health and substance abuse, that were not prominent
in the New Deal discussions are highly salient today.50 And the welfare system
has gradually assumed responsibility for healthcare under circumstances in
which both relevant technology and needs are changing rapidly.
The most distinctive policy innovations induced by these developments focus
on capacitation rather than maintenance or compensation. Where actuarial risk
pooling breaks down in an uncertain world, the welfare state strives to equip
people with skills to deal with the disruptions they face, whether in the market
or the family. The services of the new programs are typically customized and
bundled across disciplines and problems. For example, employment-related
services may be combined with family support services, or family support
services may combine education, mental health, and medical services.
At the same time, persistent and labile problems call for continuing and
adaptive intervention. Responding to unemployment will often require not just
temporary income support but also reskilling to respond to changing configura-
tions of job opportunities. Chronic educational and psychological problems—
49. See, e.g., ACKERMAN & ALSTOTT, supra note 2, at 15–16; GRAETZ & MASHAW, supra note 17;
Super, supra note 8, at 541–42.
50. See INST. OF MED. & NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE DYNAMICS OF DISABILITY: MEASURING AND
MONITORING DISABILITY FOR SOCIAL SECURITY PROGRAMS 45–46 (Gooloo S. Wunderlich et al. eds., 2002);
Mark Peyrot, Cycles of Social Problem Development: The Case of Drug Abuse, 25 SOC. Q. 83, 88–91
(1984).
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for example, substance abuse, family dysfunction, and learning disabilities—
require recurring interventions that take account of the likelihood of relapse.
The design of services reflects changes that have occurred in professional
disciplines. One is the greater capacity to diagnose and respond to idiosyncrasy.
For example, in medicine, it appears that genetic indicators will eventually
permit the customization of drugs to particular patients. More mundanely but at
the moment more importantly, effective treatment for many behavior-dependent
diseases such as diabetes is now understood to include the construction and
monitoring of an individualized plan that covers medication, diet, and activity.51
Or to take another example: educators have recently come to understand that the
debate between “phonics” and “whole language” approaches to reading was
misconceived. Each approach has techniques that are effective with some
students. The teacher should not choose wholesale between them but should
assess each student to determine the combination of interventions most helpful
to him or her.52
Reforms in most key areas of social welfare, including education, child
welfare, disability rights, and mental health, have reflected these trends in
professional practice. They typically require individual assessment and customi-
zation of services; complex, heavily diagnostic judgment; and ongoing reassess-
ment and adaptation.53 The minimalists have not taken account of these
developments.
2. Minimalist Intervention
We can assess the limitations of welfare minimalism in terms of the two most
characteristic minimalist projects in this area: norm simplification and vouchers
or stakeholder funds.
a. Norm Simplification. There is a plausible role for programs based on
simple norms that obviate pervasive, complex judgment. In his minimalist
critique of experimentalism, David Super mentions models of the kinds of
51. See CLAYTON M. CHRISTENSEN ET AL., THE INNOVATOR’S PRESCRIPTION: A DISRUPTIVE SOLUTION FOR
HEALTH CARE 56–61 (2009).
52. See Diana Jean Schemo, Federal–Local Clash in War over Teaching Reading, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
9, 2007, at A16.
53. Statutes requiring either individual service plans or “reasonable accommodation” include the
Education of the Handicapped Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-476, § 101(e), 104 Stat.
1103, 1104 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 602(a)(20)) (“Individualized Education Program”);
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193,
§ 408(b), 110 Stat. 2105, 2140 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 608(b)) (“Individual Responsibility
Plans” for public assistance recipients); Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L.
No. 96-272, § 101(a)(1), 94 Stat. 500, 503 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(16)) (“case plan”
for children in state custody); Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, § 6(a), 102
Stat. 1619, 1621 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B)) (“reasonable accommodations” of
handicapped residential housing purchasers); Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No.
101-336, § 102(b)(5)(A), 104 Stat. 327, 332 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A))
(“reasonable accommodations” for disabled workers).
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programs he favors: food stamps and Supplemental Security Income (SSI).54
These programs provide easily defined benefits (food vouchers or cash) to
broadly defined categories of indigent people—“households” (virtually any
person or group that lives outside an institution and prepares its own meals) for
food stamps, and aged and disabled people for SSI. If we put aside the
complicated issues associated with disability determination in SSI, these pro-
grams are based on relatively straightforward rules, and as far as they go, they
are successful.
The problem is that these programs do not go very far. They can get by with
uniform benefits and simple rules because each addresses only a single and
simple need—food or money—and they avoid making judgments at the margin
by undersatisfying the need. The programs provide benefits only to the most
disadvantaged, and the benefits they provide are meager. Relative to the broader
purposes of poverty relief, the programs are spectacularly underinclusive. If
food stamps and SSI constituted the whole of America’s response to poverty
and social need, they would be reviled as abominations. They can only be
considered successful as a component of a broader array of programs that
provide benefits related to health, education, job training, housing, and other
matters. These benefits typically take the form of services, and their providers
increasingly aspire to the complex customization that we noted above.
The simplification project in the welfare area to which scholars have devoted
the most attention is the vocational-grid regulation in the Social Security
Disability programs. These programs condition eligibility on permanent and
total disability, which entails a finding that there is no substantial number of
jobs that a person in the applicant’s medical condition could perform. For
decades this “vocational assessment” was made through an all-things-consid-
ered judgment, first, by a vocational expert, and second, if there was an appeal,
by an administrative law judge. The process was costly, and the resulting
judgments were wildly inconsistent. The response was to replace expert judg-
ment in a broad range of cases with a grid consisting of a set of rules that
dictated eligibility conclusions on the basis of a small number of easily determin-
able facts about age, physical capacity, education, and work experience.55
Minimalists have supported the grid as an efficient trade-off of “congruence”
(fit with substantive purposes) for “accessibility” (less expensive process and
more formal consistency). The main objection to the grid is that its simplicity
makes for underinclusion. There are some cases that would be deemed eligible
under an all-things-considered judgment for which the grid denies eligibility.
The minimalists respond that perfect justice is impossible and that the quest for
it must yield to resource constraints. Moreover, they suggest that the costs of
under- and over-inclusion will be relatively small if, as appears, the relevant
54. See Super, supra note 8, at 585, 609.
55. See 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P., app. 2 (2010). The grid is discussed in Heckler v. Chaney, 470
U.S. 821, 831–32 (1985), and Diver, supra note 14, at 88–92.
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cases are borderline or marginal. To the extent that incorrectly denied cases
resemble correctly denied ones and incorrectly accepted claims resemble cor-
rectly accepted ones, the social costs of error are likely to be relatively low.56
Two limitations of this line of analysis are becoming salient. First, the grid
approach is out of touch with changes in the social understanding of disability.
When disability programs were added to the Social Security regime in 1956, it
was generally assumed that severely incapacitated people were necessarily and
appropriately excluded from the workforce. Moreover, the idea of permanent
and total disability was considered an observable, self-defining category. But
these notions have been discredited as both normative and empirical matters.
Normatively, the inclusion of disabled people in the broadest feasible range of
social activities has become a central goal, one that is sometimes given prece-
dence over compensation. Empirically, we have discovered that a combination
of rehabilitation services and reasonable accommodation at the workplace can
enable a large fraction of those once considered incapable of significant work to
perform a broad range of jobs. Thus, a variety of programs for disabled people
provide or mandate customized services or workplace accommodation.57
It is no surprise then that, as Jerry Mashaw reports, many urge that the Social
Security program move away from its compensation focus and its categorical
norms toward “a community-based and multidisciplinary approach that would
deploy financial assistance, medical care, and rehabilitation and transportation
services, among other things, to promote the overall well-being and highest
possible functioning of disability beneficiaries.” This revised approach, Mashaw
emphasizes, “would demand highly discretionary judgments.”58
Second, the most commonly asserted arguments for the grid are static cost–
benefit arguments. By contrast, modern management theory emphasizes that
detection and correction of individual errors involves opportunities for systemic
improvement.59 Errors can be corrected in a specialized department that ad-
dresses only the particular defective product. Alternatively, they can be ad-
dressed diagnostically: the causes of a particular defect can be mapped, and the
systemic flaws can be remedied along with the individual problem. As a purely
logical matter, either approach might be efficient, but a full assessment has to
consider not only accuracy and decision costs but also the opportunity costs and
benefits of learning and systemic improvement. Companies that feel pressures
and opportunities to innovate often decide that they do better to sacrifice static
56. See Diver, supra note 14, at 90–92; Jerry L. Mashaw, How Much of What Quality? A Comment
on Conscientious Procedural Design, 65 CORNELL L. REV. 823, 824–28 (1980).
57. See generally Alan M. Jette & Elizabeth Badley, Conceptual Issues in the Measurement of Work
Disability, in THE DYNAMICS OF DISABILITY: MEASURING AND MONITORING DISABILITY FOR SOCIAL SECURITY
PROGRAMS, supra note 50, at 183, 183–210 (providing a conceptual definition of disability).
58. Jerry L. Mashaw, Accountability and Institutional Design: Some Thoughts on the Grammar of
Governance, in PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY: DESIGNS, DILEMMAS AND EXPERIENCES 115, 154–55 (Michael W.
Dowdle ed., 2006).
59. See JAMES P. WOMACK & DANIEL T. JONES, LEAN THINKING 133–34 (2003).
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optimization in order to strive for continuous improvement. When they do so,
they tend to adopt explicitly superoptimal norms such as “total quality” or “zero
defects,” refusing to consider (at least rhetorically) that any level of error could
be optimal.
In Social Security disability, that cases under- and over-included by the grid
regulation tend to be borderline has different implications from static and
dynamic perspectives. In a static sense, the proponents are right to suggest that
the social cost of incongruence is relatively low. But from a dynamic perspec-
tive, the opportunity costs of formal rules in these cases may be relatively high
because these may be the cases in which the potential for learning and systemic
gain from contextual examination may be highest. Even in the current system,
which is largely preoccupied with sorting people into categories of disabled or
nondisabled, contextual examination in marginal cases might have exceptional
diagnostic value if the characteristics ignored or overemphasized by the rules
are shared by relatively large numbers of applicants. For example, close exami-
nation might lead to the discovery of powerful indicators of the incapacitating
effects of a particular medical condition that would be useful in other cases
involving the same condition. Moreover, if we imagine a program reconfigured
along the lines of recent criticisms to combine income support with rehabilita-
tion, the learning potential from contextual inquiry may be highest in borderline
cases because these may turn out to be the cases in which rehabilitation has the
most promise.
b. Vouchers and Choice Architecture. Housing and school vouchers are a
natural extension of minimalist logic. David Super expresses particular enthusi-
asm for housing vouchers. Aside from SSI and food stamps, he points to the
Section 8 housing voucher program as a model.60 Under this program, eligible
recipients get certificates they can use to induce landlords to rent to them. The
tenant pays a percentage of her income, and the government pays the difference
between that amount and the officially determined “fair rental value” of the
apartment. The idea is to give the tenant a broader range of choices and more
leverage than traditional public housing, in which there are few choices and,
once a tenant moves in, she usually loses her subsidy if she moves.
The evidence on housing and school vouchers remains limited, and we are
open-minded on the subject. However, we note some basic limitations to the
model. Some of these limitations resemble those observed with emissions
permits. Foremost among these are information demands. Perhaps it is easier to
design a voucher than to run a school or housing project directly, but voucher
programs require administrators to set a price. If the housing voucher price is
too low, landlords refuse to participate. If the price is too high, they get a
windfall. The Section 8 program Super admires has suffered from both prob-
lems. During some periods, a large fraction of certificates awarded to applicants
60. See Super, supra note 8, at 609.
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were returned unused because the holders could not find a suitable apartment
for which the landlord would accept the certificate. At the same time, it has been
asserted that in some localities, the certificates gave landlords more than the
market value of their apartments.61
There are further problems with vouchers in the welfare context. Beneficia-
ries may lack either adequate information or adequate analytical capacity to
make good choices with their vouchers (as some minimalists themselves empha-
size). In addition, providers have strong incentives to “cream,” that is, to seek
the voucher holders who can be served most easily. Instead of competing by
trying to provide better services, they can compete by better identifying and
attracting low-cost clients. Landlords will look for the most stable families;
schools for students with the most promising preexisting abilities and behav-
ioral traits; and medical facilities for the healthiest people.62
Moreover, the effectiveness of schools and housing is widely thought to be
influenced by the social mix of the local population. Average achievement may
be higher when classrooms have a mix of ability levels than when they are
segregated by ability. Disadvantaged people may do better in racially and
economically integrated neighborhoods. Integration may require a complex
balance of groups, achieving a “critical mass” needed for minority group
members to feel comfortable, on the one hand, and avoiding the “tipping point”
that triggers the flight of the privileged, on the other. If integration or social
balance is a goal, then it seems unlikely that it can be achieved through unaided
individual choice. Aside from discrimination by providers and local govern-
ments, there is a coordination problem.63
Some combination of information and coordination problems seems to ac-
count for the finding that “if given vouchers, poor people choose . . . segre-
gated areas similar to the ones they left.”64 The most admired effort to achieve
housing integration with vouchers—the Gautreaux program in Chicago—
depends heavily on professional services to match applicants with apartments
and to counsel them about adjusting to life in their new neighborhoods.
61. See Jenifer J. Curhan, The HUD Reinvention: A Critical Analysis, 5 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 239,
243–45, 250–51 (1995). The danger of setting the price too low could be avoided by giving the voucher
a flat base value and allowing the tenant to add any amount she wants to it. However, some worry that
this approach, if widely used, might contribute to rent inflation.
62. Participants in voucher and other school-choice programs tend to have disproportionately high
socioeconomic status even though the programs usually require schools to choose among applicants by
lottery. Advantaged students are more likely to apply and more likely to remain in these schools. This
probably is due, in part, to parental motivation and information but also is likely a function of the
schools’ outreach and recruiting and the degree of support they provide to students who struggle. See
DIANE RAVITCH, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF THE GREAT AMERICAN SCHOOL SYSTEM: HOW TESTING AND CHOICE
ARE UNDERMINING EDUCATION 129–47 (2010).
63. See James S. Liebman, Voice, Not Choice, 101 YALE L.J. 259, 292 (1991) (reviewing JOHN E.
CHUBB & TERRY M. MOE, POLITICS, MARKETS, AND AMERICA’S SCHOOLS (1990)).
64. James E. Rosenbaum & Stefanie DeLuca, Does Changing Neighborhoods Change Lives? The
Chicago Gautreaux Housing Program and Recent Mobility Programs 5 (Inst. for Policy Research, Nw.
Univ., Working Paper No. WP-09-01, 2009).
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Healthcare cost control is the major social-welfare challenge of the day. We
doubt that the minimalists’ approach can play more than a secondary role in
effective reform, and we worry that it will discourage critical reforms that
depend on the kind of administrative capacity they are skeptical of.
The central American public healthcare programs, and even private insur-
ance, already have voucher-like characteristics. The main difference between
Medicare or Medicaid entitlements and a housing or school voucher is that there
is no cap on the amount of benefits that the beneficiary of the health programs
can demand. The system thus gives providers an incentive to overtreat and to
use relatively expensive treatment that may not even serve the medical interests
of the patient, much less social efficiency.
The economists’ favored approach to the problem involves making consum-
ers more selective by tightening their budget constraints (for example, by
cutting back tax subsidies and encouraging healthcare savings accounts and
employer self-insurance).65 A competing response involves administrative re-
view of practice decisions under continuously updated standards.66
The minimalists are unlikely to be comfortable with either perspective. The
economists’ vision relies on individual choice to an extent the minimalists know
is implausible. The alternative perspective calls for exactly the kind of complex
administrative capacity that the minimalists despair of creating.
The difficulties for minimalism in this area can be seen in the chapter on
health insurance in Sunstein and Richard Thaler’s Nudge.67 It focuses on the
Medicare Part D prescription drug plan inaugurated in 2003. The program
requires most beneficiaries to choose among a variety of private plans. Sunstein
and Thaler summarize evidence that shows two crippling problems. First, left to
themselves, many people will not choose at all, and if the default is no
coverage, they will lose coverage. Second, most people do not seem to choose
the plan that is most beneficial to them. We know this because researchers can
get an idea of what people’s drug needs are from the records of their plans and
then compare the coverage (deductible, copayments, ceilings) they chose with
the coverage they could have gotten under alternative plans.
Sunstein and Thaler propose a classic minimalist response: manipulation of
default rules and choice architecture. Instead of no coverage, the default for
nonchoosers should be a plan chosen by the government. And the government
should make these default choices, not randomly (as is now done for some
beneficiaries), but by “intelligent assignment.” The government can use avail-
able data to calculate which plan is most likely to be the best for nonchoosers
and assign them to it provisionally. For choosers, the key is to present the data
at the time of decision in a way that helps the beneficiary choose effectively. For
65. See generally JOHN F. COGAN, R. GLENN HUBBARD & DANIEL P. KESSLER, HEALTHY, WEALTHY, AND
WISE: FIVE STEPS TO A BETTER HEALTH CARE SYSTEM (2005) (proposing market-based healthcare tax,
regulatory, and insurance reforms).
66. See CHRISTENSEN ET AL., supra note 51, at 56–65.
67. See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 18, at 161–74.
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example, the choice document can contain a list of the beneficiary’s drug uses in
the past year and the net cost to the patient of such drugs under alternative
plans.
Note that, for their only discussion of health insurance, the authors chose a
relatively small and manageable portion of the picture. Even if we saw the kind
of assisted choice they propose as effective here, it would be harder to see it
working with respect to the more complicated choices involved in, say, choos-
ing a doctor or a hospital or a comprehensive insurance plan.68
And, most strikingly, even in this relatively simple case, choice ends up doing
very little work. Sunstein and Thaler argue convincingly that, by using sophisti-
cated data aggregation and analysis, the government can make plausible deci-
sions about the interests of the large fraction of people disinclined to choose.
They suggest further that the government can use the same tools to present data
to choosers in a way that will make their choices effective. It seems quite likely
that, for many choosers, the presentation of the data will more or less determine
the choice. To the extent that the government can accurately determine the best
choice and can present the data that underlies that determination clearly, choos-
ers will simply ratify the government’s decision. To the extent that choosers
depart from the government prediction, it could mean that they understand their
situation better than the government, or it could mean that they are confused. In
the former case, choice would serve as a valuable check on the government’s
analytical apparatus (which presumably could be continuously improved as the
government investigates the reasons for the discrepancies). In the latter case,
choice is just noise and nuisance. But in either case, the key intervention
involves much more than a nudge; it is a kind of complex administration that
minimalism tends to acknowledge only as an afterthought.69
68. In a 2010 speech, Sunstein, as Administrator of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs,
described the Obama Administration’s “approach to regulation” as focused on, in addition to cost–
benefit analysis, “[d]efault [r]ules and [s]implification.” See Sunstein, supra note 36. Aside from
encouraging automatic employer enrollment in retirement savings plans, the only examples he cited
involved better disclosure to consumers or workers of the risks of products such as chemicals, tobacco,
or bank loans. All the interventions seem sound but, with the exception of financial-products disclosure,
they seem minor in comparison to the reforms adopted or proposed by the Administration in such areas
as food safety, bank solvency, education, healthcare, and offshore oil drilling. Id. The Consumer
Financial Protection Board created by the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act of 2010 appears to be the only major initiative strongly influenced by minimalist ideas. See
Elizabeth Warren, Unsafe at Any Rate, DEMOCRACY, Summer 2007, at 8, 17–18 (arguing for the
importance of consumer-protection interventions in finance based on nudges and choice architecture).
69. You would never know from Sunstein and Thaler’s breezy discussion of the potential contribu-
tions of minimalism that Medicare Part D involves a policy fiasco on a scale of the SO2 scrubber
legislation that Ackerman and Hassler famously denounced in Clean Coal/Dirty Air. See ACKERMAN &
HASSLER, supra note 9, at 1–5. In larding unnecessary subsidies on the drug industry and precluding
government price negotiation or foreign imports, Medicare Part D, like the scrubber legislation,
represents the victory of special-interest rent seeking and regulatory dogmatism over sensible public
policy. See, e.g., Louise M. Slaughter, Medicare Part D—The Product of a Broken Process, 354 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 2314, 2315 (2006). There is one difference: the relevant dogmatism in the case of the
scrubber legislation was New Deal command and control. With Part D, it is market fetishism. To be
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II. EXPERIMENTALISM
Experimentalism takes its name from John Dewey’s political philosophy,
which aims to precisely accommodate the continuous change and variation that
we see as the most pervasive challenge of current public problems. Policies
should be “experimental in the sense that they will be entertained subject to
constant and well-equipped observation of the consequences they entail when
acted upon, and subject to ready and flexible revision in the light of observed
consequences,” he wrote.70 At the same time, he rejected standardized bureau-
cratic solutions and urged responses that combined respect for local context
with centralized structure and discipline. Aside from education, in which he was
an active reformer, Dewey offered little by way of concrete illustrations of his
proposals, but postwar developments in business management and recent re-
forms in many public policy areas connect fruitfully with Dewey’s theories.
In the United States, some experimentalist institutions have emerged in
sectors such as nuclear power and food safety, in which technological and
economic change has outstripped the capacities of established market and
bureaucratic safeguards to protect key public interests. Others have emerged in
settings such as public education or child protective services, in which decades
of apparently fruitless and interminable debate have created strategic uncer-
tainty among the contending parties and opened them to interventions aimed at
learning from promising local experience.
In the European Union and in many international regimes, experimentalist
institutions have arisen from the realization that mutual evaluation and learning
from diverse national practices is sometimes the only feasible way of coordina-
tion in the absence of a conventional national sovereign with presumptive
authority to fix common goals.
Not all of these regimes have complete or well-configured architectures, but
we consider them experimentalist to the extent that they are designed to achieve
local adaptation and aggregate learning by combining discretion with duties to
report and explain, and by pooling information. We do not suggest that any of
these regimes has proven its efficacy over alternative approaches to the prob-
lems they address. In most cases, experience is limited or has not been thor-
oughly studied. But each of the regimes has functional and jurisprudential
properties that make them a distinctively promising response to the dimension
of uncertainty in these problems. Our optimism about experimentalism is based
most generally on this fit between structures and problems.
sure, the minimalists are not to blame for the bad faith and unreflective uses of their ideas, but the fact
that Sunstein and Thaler can discuss their market-mimicking reform without any indication of how
dependent it might be on a deeply dysfunctional infrastructure suggests that even well-considered
discussions can have distorting effects.
70. DEWEY, supra note 3.
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A. BASIC ARCHITECTURE
We start with a relatively abstract model of experimentalism in which the
basic constituents are a “center” and a set of “local units.” In practice, the center
is sometimes the national government, and the local units its federated states or
municipalities. Or the center could be a government agency, and the local units
the private actors it regulates or the public or private service providers with
which it contracts. Or the center might be a single public or private organiza-
tion, with the local units its (territorial) subdivisions: a state department of child
welfare services and its regional districts, as one example, or a school district
and its individual schools as another.
These relations are often nested, with an entity such as a school district at
once the local unit of a broader (state) jurisdiction and the center of a territorial
unit of its own; but the relation between contiguous “higher” and “lower” units
is the same, regardless of where they are located in the overall system. Together,
the center and local units set and revise goals, and the means of pursuing them,
in an iterative process with four basic elements.
First, framework goals (such as “adequate education” or “good water status”)
and provisional measures for gauging their achievement are established, whether
by legislation, administrative action, or court order, through consultation among
the center and local units and relevant outside stakeholders. Second, local units
are explicitly given broad discretion to pursue these ends as they see fit.
But third, as a condition of this autonomy, the local units must report
regularly on their performance and participate in a peer review in which their
results are compared with those units employing other means to the same
general ends. These reviews require the local units to describe and explain their
efforts to peers and superiors; to show that they have considered alternatives;
and to demonstrate that they are making progress by some jointly acknowledged
measure of success, or are making plausible adjustments if not. The center
provides services and inducements that facilitate this disciplined comparison of
local performances and mutual learning among local units.
Finally, the framework goals, performance measures, and decision-making
procedures themselves are periodically revised on the basis of alternatives
reported and evaluated in peer reviews, and the cycle repeats.
This model involves the following characteristics.
1. Decentralization
Like minimalism but in contrast to command and control, experimentalism
combines decentralization of operative control with central coordination of the
evaluation of results. John Braithwaite’s observation on the most successful
private mine safety efforts exemplifies this feature of the experimentalist archi-
tecture:
[W]hile all these companies have decentralized control over safety, they also
all have centralized assessment of the safety performance of line managers.
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All carefully monitor each mine and each district to ascertain whether their
accident and fatality rates are improving or worsening in relation to the
performance of previous years and to the performance of other mines and
districts. . . . [For all the local managers,] the sense that the head office is
watching their safety performance is pervasive.71
2. Signals and Norms
Experimentalism has been influenced by twentieth-century innovations in
economic organization. In particular, it reflects the practices of “learning by
monitoring” and “continuous improvement” exemplified by the Toyota Produc-
tion System.72 This system breaks strongly with organizational premises shared
by both command-and-control and minimalist administration. Toyota-style orga-
nization rejects any strong distinction between making rules, on the one hand,
and applying them, on the other. It contemplates that rules will be continuously
revised in the course of application. It treats rule departures diagnostically as
symptoms of systemic problems and opportunities for systemic improvement.
Sometimes, instead of minimizing or isolating them, it tends to induce and
expand them (for example, by eliminating “buffer inventory stocks” and impos-
ing superoptimal standards like “zero defects”) in order to make the system’s
weaknesses transparent.
The normative structure of regimes of this kind differs from minimalism in
regulating in detail and across many dimensions. Experimentalist norms govern
both performances or outcomes (such as aggregate CO2 emissions or scores on
educational tests) and processes (such as the calibration of a furnace or the use
of a particular math exercise). However, the experimentalist regimes differ from
command and control in that a large fraction of their norms are indicative or
presumptive rather than mandatory. These regimes have mandatory norms
requiring planning, reporting, monitoring, and, often, minimally satisfactory
performance. But many norms take the form of indicators that measure perfor-
mance above mandatory minima, or presumptive rules that need not be fol-
lowed when doing so would frustrate their underlying purposes. In such cases,
the agent can depart from the rule but only if she signals her departure and
explains her reasons to peers or superiors. In a phrase used in the EU, her duty
is to “comply or explain.”73
The function of nonmandatory rules is not to control discretion but to make
practice transparent. They facilitate diagnosis and improvement. The narrow-
dimension performance norms emphasized in minimalist regimes are measures
of how well an actor is doing overall but often say little about the causes of his
71. JOHN BRAITHWAITE, TO PUNISH OR PERSUADE: ENFORCEMENT OF COAL MINE SAFETY 64 (1985).
72. See generally William H. Simon, Toyota Jurisprudence: Legal Theory and Rolling Rule Re-
gimes, in LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND THE US, supra note 3, at 37, 44–55.
73. See Christopher Hogg, The “Comply or Explain” Approach to Improving Standards of Corpo-
rate Governance, QFINANCE, http://www.qfinance.com/contentFiles/QF02/g9l6zjv5/18/0/the-comply-or-
explain-approach-to-improving-standards-of-corporate-governance.pdf (last visited July 19, 2011).
80 [Vol. 100:53THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
success or failure. The more broadly dimensional experimentalist norms aspire
to provide a rich array of weak signals that guide adaptation. They assist in
self-assessment and comparison with peers, but the only further obligation
associated with them is typically an attempt to improve. Moreover, because
rules are kept in tight conformity with practice, a newcomer or an outsider can
reliably read practice from the rules. This makes learning easier for insiders,
and it facilitates accountability to outsiders.
3. Incentive Design
Key norms in experimentalist regimes are designed to induce local actors to
participate in the regime. They can involve either coercive sticks or enticing
carrots. Coercive norms characteristically take the form of “penalty defaults”
that specify fairly harsh consequences if the parties fail to come up with an
acceptable alternative.74 For example, the Endangered Species Act precludes a
developer from improving land where there are endangered species unless the
developer concludes a Habitat Conservation Plan with local stakeholders. Entice-
ments might take the form of conditional grants. For example, the Obama
Administration’s Race to the Top program awards large grants for educational
reform in a competitive process in which state applications are judged on the
extent to which they demonstrate capacities to plan and self-assess, to share and
make use of information about their own and peer performances, and to
coordinate with “critical stakeholders” in both the public and private sectors.75
Experimentalism is sometimes associated with “soft law” and reliance on
informal social pressures rather than material sanctions, but this view is mislead-
ing.76 Some experimentalist sanctions are harsh, such as the no-development
rule under the Endangered Species Act. Schools, nuclear power plants, and food
processors can all suffer the harsh sanction of shutdown under experimentalist
regimes if they deliberately or persistently fail to meet mandatory performance
norms. The distinctive characteristic of experimentalist incentive design con-
cerns the behavior it is calculated to induce. In command-and-control regimes,
incentives are calculated to induce compliance with specific conduct the regula-
tor has determined to be optimal. In minimalist regimes, sanctions are designed
to induce performance along one or a very few easily measured dimensions,
such as CO2 emission reduction. The distinctive goal of experimentalist incen-
tive design is to induce actors to engage in investigation, information sharing,
and deliberation about problems with multiple dimensions that are only dimly
understood. This aim sometimes leads regulators away from sanctions likely to
74. See Karkkainen, supra note 40, at 302–04.
75. See U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., RACE TO THE TOP PROGRAM: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 6–7 (2009), available
at http://www2.ed.gov/programs/racetothetop/executive-summary.pdf.
76. In the EU and international regimes, resort to soft law is encouraged by the limited capacities for
conventional coercive enforcement. See David M. Trubek, Patrick Cottrell & Mark Nance, ‘Soft Law’,
‘Hard Law’ and EU Integration, in LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND THE US, supra note 3, at
65, 77–80.
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cause actors to hide information or to take defensive adversarial postures in
dealings with regulators. Thus, an experimentalist regime is less likely to
impose harsh monetary or criminal penalties for unintentionally harmful con-
duct under vaguely defined standards and more likely to impose them for failing
to make or execute plans or to report performance.77
4. Stakeholder Participation
Experimentalism has a more sanguine attitude than minimalism toward partici-
pation, but the type of participation it relies on is not the universalist and
voluntarist kind that minimalists disparage. Experimentalism emphasizes stake-
holder participation to elicit and reconcile the diverse views and interests of
people distinctively affected by and knowledgeable about the matters in issue.
The problems of apathy and ignorance that constrain participation in generalist
processes are less severe here. Moreover, some cognitive biases may be miti-
gated when people have strong incentives to win the cooperation of people with
whom they disagree. We expect people stranded in lifeboats to figure out a
mode of collaboration even if they have severe differences, and there may be a
more general “lifeboat effect” from local interdependence in some contexts
addressed by experimentalism.78 Moreover, we’ve seen that designers of experi-
mentalist regimes do not need to rely on common interests or cooperative
dispositions; they can alter default rules or allocate rewards in ways that
motivate responsible participation. Finally, the nature of the issues and circum-
stances that prompt experimentalist regimes may improve the prospects of
effective participation. These regimes are responses to uncertainty. They arise in
situations in which public officials are uncertain about both the definition of the
problem and its solution. In these situations, stakeholders may find it difficult to
map proposed solutions onto their selfish interests. To this extent, they may be
more open to good-faith deliberations focused on public interests.
77. Harsh sanctions deter disclosure, first by raising its cost when disclosure increases the likelihood
of discovery and sanction, and second by “crowding out” voluntary cooperation when it induces actors
to take a more calculated attitude toward the regime. See Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman,
Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An Analysis of Corporate Liability Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 687,
692–93 (1997); Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, A Fine Is a Price, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 1 (2000).
Since we are trying to portray both minimalism and experimentalism in their most promising forms,
our model of experimentalism excludes the superficially similar approach known as New Public
Management. New Public Management emphasizes performance measures and competition among
local units. However, its performance measures tend to be strong signals intended to allocate rewards
and punishments more than weak signals intended to diagnose problems and indicate directions for
improvement. And its idea of competition tends to be harshly Darwinian and to exclude the emphasis
on collaborative inquiry and peer review that is central to experimentalism. See Carol Harlow,
Accountability, New Public Management, and the Problems of the Child Support Agency, 26 J.L. SOC’Y
150, 163 (1999); Simon Head, The Grim Threat to British Universities, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Jan. 13, 2011,
at 58 (book review).
78. See ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE
ACTION 211 (1990) (concluding that a shared sense among stakeholders that all “will be harmed if they
do not adopt an alternative rule” is favorable to agreement on solutions to common-pool resource
problems).
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B. REGULATION
A variety of regulatory structures in the United States and abroad are best
understood in experimentalist terms. One is “management-based regulation” by
which the regulator requires each regulated actor to develop a plan to mitigate
specified harms; assesses the adequacy of the plans; monitors their implementa-
tion; and, through a combination of tangible penalties, technical assistance, and
public shaming, induces the laggards to comply with minimum standards and
the frontrunners to improve continuously. Examples discussed in recent scholar-
ship include the Hazards Analysis and Critical Control Points (HACCP) pro-
gram for meat and poultry at the Department of Agriculture; the Massachusetts
Toxics Use Reduction Act; the power-plant safety program of the Nuclear
Regulatory Agency; and the mining safety programs of Queensland and New
South Wales, Australia.79
Another structure involves public–private contracting in which an agency
enters into a series of bilateral contracts with large regulated actors. The
contracts commit the actor to observable performance on one or more regula-
tory dimensions, and the regulator may in return agree to waive otherwise
applicable requirements or use less frequent or costly monitoring. The EPA’s
Project Excel and OSHA’s Voluntary Protection and Strategic Partnership Pro-
grams are examples.80 Or in another variation, the government oversees, rati-
fies, or oversees and ratifies negotiations among regulated actors, NGOs, and
local stakeholders, as occurs in the Habitat Conservation Plan program adminis-
tered by the Department of the Interior under the Endangered Species Act.
A third structure involves “multi-level governance” in which regulatory
authority is decentralized to lower tier governments in ways designed to permit
adaptation to local conditions, regulatory competition, or both. The Clean Air
and Clean Water Acts and the Occupational Safety and Health Act all give states
the option of assuming important regulatory responsibilities, subject to meeting
minimum national standards.81 Some international trade regimes are pushing
participating nations in experimentalist directions. Principles of mutual recogni-
tion or “equivalence” found in many trade treaties require importing countries
to accept products produced in compliance with the regulatory regimes of the
exporting countries if these regimes provide protection substantially equivalent
79. See Coglianese & Lazer, supra note 39, at 697–99; Karkkainen, supra note 40, at 354–56; REES,
supra note 26, at 123–50; NEIL GUNNINGHAM, MINE SAFETY: LAW REGULATION POLICY 6–7 (2007); Jody
Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1, 6–7 (1997).
80. See Orly Lobel, Governing Occupational Safety in the United States, in LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE IN
THE EU AND THE US, supra note 3, at 269, 276–77. See generally ENVIRONMENTAL CONTRACTS: COMPARATIVE
APPROACHES TO REGULATORY INNOVATION IN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE (Eric W. Orts & Kurt Deketelaere
eds., 2001) (examining contracts as a means of environmental regulation). Environmental regimes have
generated the largest body of self-consciously experimentalist legal scholarship. For discussion and references,
see Cameron Holley, Facilitating Monitoring, Subverting Self-Interest and Limiting Discretion: Learning from
“New” Forms of Accountability in Practice, 35 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 127, 139–49 (2010).
81. See 42 U.S.C. § 7413 (2006) (Clean Air Act); 33 U.S.C. § 1313 (2006) (Clean Water Act); 29
U.S.C. § 667 (2006) (Occupational Safety and Health Act).
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to the importing countries’ regimes.82 Such provisions require trading partners
to engage in a kind of peer review of each other’s regimes. International
organizations within and outside the World Trade Organization promote informa-
tion exchanges and discussions of regulatory standards among member states.83
Multilevel governance is especially prominent in the European Union. As the
EU’s authority has expanded from its initial focus on trade barriers to embrace
almost the full range of its member states’ public policies, it has assumed a
distinctively experimentalist cast. Early EU intervention commonly took the
form of harmonizing directives, mandating that states adopt substantially uni-
form rules. Recent interventions have more often taken the form of framework
directives, such as the 2000 water quality mandate, or variations on the “open
method of coordination,” such as those prescribed for macroeconomic and
employment policies.84 These interventions articulate general goals and metrics
for measuring progress toward them; mandate that states formulate their own
“action plans” for attaining the goals; provide for monitoring of member efforts,
exchange of information among states, and peer criticism orchestrated by the
European Commission; and contemplate periodic reassessment and rearticula-
tion of goals and metrics.
The ground-level configuration of experimentalist regulation depends in part
on whether the risks it addresses take the form more of concentrated, large-scale
catastrophes, such as a nuclear reactor meltdown, or of relatively diffuse
dangers, such as tainted food. Regimes focused on catastrophe avoidance
emphasize event notification—the duty and capacity of regulated actors to
identify and report weak signals of systemic problems and to respond to such
reports.
In U.S. nuclear power safety, for instance, plants must initially satisfy a
demanding set of structural requirements and then must report all potentially
dangerous significant operating events, ranging from interruptions in power
generation to unexpected deterioration of equipment, to the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission. The NRC evaluates the reports and notifies all operators of
possible hazards. Thus, the failure of a noncritical valve in one facility can lead
to a notice alerting all the others to inspect similar valves, some of which may
indeed be performing critical functions. Peer reviews are conducted frequently
to evaluate the facilities’ responses to such notices. In addition, plants are
ranked annually on their overall performance with regard to operating safety.
These rankings, along with other safety information, are provided directly to the
82. See Kalypso Nicolaidis & Gregory Shaffer, Transnational Mutual Recognition Regimes: Gover-
nance Without Global Government, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 263, 264 & n.3 (2005).
83. See generally JOANNE SCOTT, THE WTO AGREEMENT ON SANITARY AND PHYTOSANITARY MEASURES
(2007) (examining the role of the SPS Agreement in promoting information exchanges).
84. See Council Directive 2000/60/EC, 2000 O.J. (L 327) 1 (EU); Council Decision 2003/573/EC,
2003 O.J. (L 197) 13, 17 (EU). See generally Charles F. Sabel & Jonathan Zeitlin, Learning from
Difference: The New Architecture of Experimentalist Governance in the EU, 14 EUR. L.J. 271, 271
(2008) (describing the importance of framework goals in EU governance).
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highest level managers and the operator’s board of directors to ensure that
criticism is not dulled by passage through a managerial hierarchy.85
By contrast, in food processing, in which the range of acceptably safe
arrangements is much wider than in nuclear power generation and the risk of
catastrophe less, responsibility for identifying and mitigating hazards rests more
with the operators. In Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points programs,
processors specify the points in their own production processes in which precise
control is necessary to prevent contamination by pathogens, develop hazard-
mitigation plans for each plant describing how control should be exercised, and
design a testing regime to confirm the efficacy of the measures they propose.
The regulator reviews and approves the plans and monitors the firms’ compli-
ance with their plans. Finally, plans increasingly include provisions for tracing
products as they are processed, so that when failures occur it is possible to
identify the entity and the procedures that failed.86
The Food Safety Modernization Act of 2010 generalizes the HACCP ap-
proach, which was previously confined in the United States to processors of
meat, poultry, and a few other products, to virtually all food processors above a
minimum size. The core of the bill is a mandate that the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) require processors to formulate, validate, and continu-
ously update HACCP plans (now called Hazard Analysis and Preventive Con-
trols). The Act requires the FDA to allocate its inspection resources in accordance
with an assessment of the relative riskiness of regulated facilities. Among the
specified risk factors are the adequacy of a facility’s plan and its implementa-
tion, and whether the facility has been certified by a private auditor that is in
good standing under an accreditation regime.87
In practice, the distinctions between the event-reporting and risk-planning
approaches blur as systems based on risk-mitigation planning increasingly focus
on event notification and vice versa. Thus, in food safety, the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention coordinates a network that continuously ana-
lyzes data from healthcare providers about food-borne illnesses, which federal
and state regulators use to target their efforts.88 At the same time, the ability to
respond effectively to the information disseminated by event-notification sys-
tems of the type familiar from the nuclear-power-generating industry is seen as
depending on the kind of careful and continuing review of facility operations
associated with the implementation of HACCP plans. The convergence of the
85. See REES, supra note 26, at 123–50.
86. See COMM. ON THE REVIEW OF THE USE OF SCIENTIFIC CRITERIA & PERFORMANCE STANDARDS FOR
SAFE FOOD, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, SCIENTIFIC CRITERIA TO ENSURE SAFE FOOD 133–75 (2003).
87. See FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 111-353, §§ 103, 201, 307, 124 Stat.
3885, 3889–90, 3923, 3962 (2011) (to be codified in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).
88. See Richard L. Arkin, PulseNet, FoodNet, NARMS; Tools To Fight Disease, Protect Public
Health, 22 FDA VETERINARIAN, no. 6, 2007 at 6, 6, available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/
AnimalVeterinary/NewsEvents/FDAVeterinarianNewsletter/UCM055723.pdf. The FDA Food Safety
Modernization Act requires FDA efforts to strengthen “foodborne illness surveillance systems.” § 205.
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reporting and planning approaches can be seen in the 2010 report of the
National Commission on the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Dril-
ling. The Commission’s recommendations, modeled in part on the nuclear
safety regime, call for both government-orchestrated and -enforced planning at
the facility level and a system of peer information exchange and review.89
Another interesting area in which experimentalist regulatory practices are
converging is drug regulation. The system of drug regulation established during
the New Deal requires “approval” by the Food and Drug Administration prior to
“marketing.” Approval typically involves an expensive and rigorous testing
process focused around clinical trials. The FDA then makes a decision whether
to permit marketing on the basis of a general assessment as to whether likely
benefits to people within the prescription criteria outweigh likely costs such as
inefficacy and side effects. This framework initially had little to say about what
happened postapproval and, until 2007, postapproval duties of both the manufac-
turers and the FDA were much more limited and ambiguous than preapproval
ones.90
This system has been subject to two salient criticisms. First, critics asserted
that the approval process was too lengthy and expensive and, in particular, that
it unnecessarily delayed access to potentially beneficial drugs. Second, they
decried the scantiness of postapproval regulation, pointing to a series of scan-
dals in which approved drugs continued to be marketed despite evidence that
they were doing unanticipated harm.91
Pressure on the New Deal structure was also increased by trends in medicine
toward greater individuation of treatment. These include “personalized medi-
cine,” which uses genetics to customize treatments and drugs to the characteris-
tics of the patient, and “behavioral medicine,” which focuses on patient education,
communication, and monitoring.
Another important set of developments involves the aggregate analysis of
patient treatment data. A significant current health policy priority is to develop
information systems for standardized recording and transmission of individual
treatment data (while protecting the patient’s privacy).92 Aside from facilitating
coherent patient care by making past history transparent to current caregivers,
such systems could contribute to the continuous assessment of treatments,
including drug efficacy. Drug efficacy has been studied in a controlled environ-
ment because that has been the only way to get sufficiently precise data on the
89. See NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL & OFFSHORE DRILLING, DEEP WATER:
THE GULF OIL DISASTER AND THE FUTURE OF OFFSHORE DRILLING 217–91 (2011). See especially the
discussion of the nuclear-safety regime.
90. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-402, DRUG SAFETY: IMPROVEMENT NEEDED IN FDA’S
POSTMARKET DECISION-MAKING AND OVERSIGHT PROCESS 18 (2006); CHRISTENSEN ET AL., supra note 51, at 62.
91. See, e.g., Laura B. Faden & Christopher-Paul Milne, Pharmacovigilance Activities in the United
States, European Union and Japan: Harmonic Convergence or Convergent Evolution?, 63 FOOD &
DRUG L.J. 683, 685–89 (2008).
92. See CHRISTENSEN ET AL., supra note 51, at 133–47, 177–78.
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baseline condition of the patient and the nature and effect of the intervention.
But with sufficiently precise and standardized routine treatment reporting, the
line between clinical trials and routine treatment would blur.
If current trends continue, the key judgment for drug regulators will cease to
be a binary call about whether to permit general marketing of a drug. Instead,
regulation will focus on ensuring that the drugs are properly customized to the
patient and properly integrated with other medical and behavioral interventions.
As the line between research and treatment erodes, a one-time, global, cost–
benefit judgment will be far less important than an ongoing capacity to monitor
data for signals of problems and opportunities.
These trends are reflected in the Food and Drug Administration Amendments
Act of 2007. Among other things, the Amendments increase the FDA’s authority
to require specified, ongoing research as a condition of approval; require that
the Agency enhance its Adverse Event Reporting System; and mandate that it
establish a system of proactive monitoring of drug efficacy through targeted
inquiries of healthcare records.93
The advent of personalized and behavioral medicine suggests the likelihood
of a trend toward regulatory regimes configured to particular drugs. Steps in this
direction are evident in the Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies (REMS)
encouraged by the 2007 Amendments. As a condition of approval, the FDA can
require the promoter to formulate and implement a REMS. An example is the
highly regarded System for Thalidomide Education and Prescribing Safety
(STEPS). Thalidomide was once prescribed widely for a variety of common
conditions like insomnia and anxiety, but it was banned after the discovery that
it severely increased the risk to pregnant women of birth defects. Since then,
research has indicated that the drug is uniquely effective with certain conditions
associated with leprosy. It can now be prescribed to patients with these condi-
tions but only in accordance with STEPS protocols that require registration and
training of the prescribing physician, the dispensing pharmacist, and the patient;
birth control and pregnancy testing for women of child-bearing age and close
monitoring of all patients; and regular reporting of treatment and patient
conditions. The program is administered by a multidisciplinary committee
within Celgene, the manufacturer, and another one within the Slone Epidemio-
logical Unit of the Boston University School of Medicine. The latter committee
has patient representatives, including delegates from the March of Dimes and
the Thalidomide Victims Association of Canada. The committees enforce compli-
ance in part through audits and “mak[e] recommendations to the FDA for
changes in the program based on real-time data.”94
Drug regulation has long been experimental in the sense that it has based key
93. See Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-85, § 921, 121
Stat. 823, 962 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355(k)).
94. See Jerome B. Zeldis et al., S.T.E.P.S.TM: A Comprehensive Program for Controlling and
Monitoring Access to Thalidomide, 21 CLINICAL THERAPEUTICS 319, 324 (1999). See generally INST. FOR
ALT. FUTURES, OPTIMAL FUTURES FOR RISK EVALUATION AND MITIGATION STRATEGIES (REMS) (2010)
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judgments on disciplined empirical assessments. But as long as experimentation
was confined to a specialized realm and associated with one-time, binary
judgments, it lacked the features associated with experimentalism. As it moves
to emphasize and integrate event notification with contextual risk planning, it
increasingly resembles experimentalist regimes such as nuclear power and
HACCP.
It is not easy to account for such regimes in minimalist terms. Static notions
of optimization capture very little of the central thrust of the system, which is to
facilitate learning and continuous revision. Moreover, by blurring the line
between rulemaking and implementation, the system precludes the kind of
accountability that binds local actors to centrally promulgated rules.
In comparison to the minimalist approach, the experimentalist approach to
regulation promises the following advantages.
First, these regimes create pressures to respond to weak signals with self-
diagnosis and corrective action. Moreover, they can provide a range of incen-
tives, including rewards and subsidies, reputational effects, and conventional
penalties.
Second, experimentalist regulation reduces the information burden on the
regulator in determining initial levels of acceptable performance. To the extent
that performance standards are based on questions of technical or economic
feasibility, they can be set based upon observed experiences across the full
population of regulated actors. The regulator can require that plants that fail to
perform at some fraction of average industry performance be subject to reme-
dial or punitive consequences, or both. Under the HACCP regime for meat and
poultry safety in the United States, only the poorest performing two percent of
plants—those whose products most frequently test positive for conveniently
measured proxies of pathogens—are at risk of closure. But as laggards improve
or exit the industry, the average performance rises and the minimum standards
could “ratchet up” without the need for special investigations or proceedings of
the kind necessary, for example, to adjust allowance allocations in a cap-and-
trade regime.95
Third, experimentalist regimes accommodate diversity by leaving extensive
discretion to local actors while making their activities mutually transparent. The
key mechanisms involve metrics that measure performance. Experimentalism
co-opts the paradox of standardization: by imposing uniformity along a few
dimensions, we permit more variations on others.96 Microbiological testing for
both serious toxins and specified proxy organisms permits us to compare food
processing plants and identify the leaders and laggards, while leaving them
(discussing REMS in the context of the Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007 and
healthcare system evolution).
95. Unfortunately, as implemented, the U.S. HACCP regime lacks this ratcheting up feature. See 9
C.F.R. § 310.25 (2010).
96. See DEWEY, supra note 3, at 215 (“Uniformity and standardization may provide an underlying
basis for differentiation and liberation of individual potentialities.”).
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substantial discretion over their operations. Minimalist market-simulation re-
gimes aspire to achieve the same goal, but their logic focuses effort around a
single indicator: price. Because experimentalist regimes rely on a range of
indicators, they are less vulnerable to the failure of one. And their indicators
typically have more diagnostic value than prices.97
Fourth, an experimentalist regime readily propagates relevant technical and
organizational advances that may not circulate freely under bureaucratic or
minimalist regulation. Event notification and risk planning tend to make techni-
cal knowledge accessible to both regulators and peers. The agency can provide
technical assistance to firms in developing risk-management plans or can dissemi-
nate quick fixes to problems registered in event-notification systems. It can
mandate publication of risk-management plans and can encourage or mandate
information exchanges through peer review. It can subsidize demonstration
projects in which progressive firms get assistance in customizing new technol-
ogy to local conditions so that its potential can be publicized to the firm’s
peers.98
C. SOCIAL WELFARE
In the welfare area, promising programs with key experimentalist traits can
be found in at least two broad areas.
The first includes programs that provide individualized services. These in-
clude child protective services, healthcare, “special” and general education, job
training, mental health services, and disability capacitation. They typically
require highly individuated planning, pervasive performance measurement, and
efforts to aggregate and disseminate information about effective practices.
The second area involves public participation in the design of local public
goods. Notable examples are community policing and community economic
development. In community policing, police consult with neighborhood groups
in order to set priorities in local law-enforcement objectives, to obtain local
knowledge to configure strategies, and to coordinate with private activities in
implementing enforcement plans. Success is monitored in terms of various
indicators of safety. In community economic development, government agen-
97. Robert Kaplan and David Norton propose the use of a “Balanced Scorecard” consisting of
parallel sets of outcome and performance measures: “Outcome measures without performance [mea-
sures] do not communicate how the outcomes are to be achieved. . . . [P]erformance [measures
may] . . . fail to reveal whether the operational improvements have been translated into . . . en-
hanced financial performance.” ROBERT S. KAPLAN & DAVID P. NORTON, THE BALANCED SCORECARD:
TRANSLATING STRATEGY INTO ACTION 150 (1996).
98. See DANIEL P. CARPENTER, THE FORGING OF BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY: REPUTATIONS, NETWORKS, AND
POLICY INNOVATION IN EXECUTIVE AGENCIES, 1862–1928, at 238–54 (2001); VON HIPPEL, supra note 47, at
93–132; Atul Gawande, Testing, Testing, NEW YORKER, Dec. 14, 2009, at 34, 38–39; Kathleen G.
Noonan, Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Legal Accountability in the Service-Based Welfare
State: Lessons from Child Welfare Reform, 34 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 523, 545 (2009); Charles Sabel,
Self-Discovery as a Coordination Problem 10–11 (2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with The
Georgetown Law Journal).
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cies and private charities make financial and technical assistance available to
community-based organizations to implement locally produced plans for hous-
ing, job, and business development. Again, projects are evaluated in terms of an
array of criteria, and the more successful organizations receive priority in later
rounds of funding.99
These programs redefine the conventional relation between the center and the
frontline. The center’s role is no longer merely to monitor frontline compliance
with promulgated standards. It is responsible for providing the infrastructure
and services that support frontline efforts. Thus, the role of the principal in the
experimentalist school is not just to verify that the teacher’s class is studiously
at work but also to organize the specialized services and framework conditions—
remedial reading, testing to diagnose learning difficulties, coaching in team
building—on which the teacher’s team must rely in formulating and implement-
ing individual learning plans.
In child welfare, caseworkers rely on a center that trains and otherwise
qualifies foster parents, facilitates contracting with outside specialists, and
marshals resources to respond to the unexpected needs of particular families or
sudden community-wide problems (for example, a tornado or an epidemic of
methamphetamine abuse). In community policing, the precinct and its subunits
count on a department that provides timely information about the migration of
crime and criminals from one neighborhood to another (perhaps in response to
local success in policing), helps orchestrate cooperation with community groups
that work with youth recently released from detention and at risk of reincarcera-
tion, and provides mediation and consultation services in the aftermath of racial
incidents.
The key influence in the move toward experimentalism is the view that
services need to be tailored to the needs of beneficiaries. Such tailoring requires
the active participation of beneficiaries because effective intervention depends
on their cooperation or because they have information essential to diagnosis and
planning. As Dewey wrote,“[t]he man who wears the shoe knows best . . .
where it pinches.”100
Tailoring also requires an understanding of local context. A child welfare
worker putting together a plan for an obese child may be able to include a
bicycle in the plan if she knows that the family’s church can be persuaded to
come up with one if credibly assured that it will fill an important need. Police
dealing with a high-crime neighborhood can be more effective if they learn
from local residents that a poorly maintained house from which drugs are sold is
a magnet for nonresident deviants.
The solitary street-level bureaucrat, who was discovered in the organizational
99. See FUNG, supra note 29; WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE COMMUNITY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT MOVE-
MENT: LAW, BUSINESS, & THE NEW SOCIAL POLICY (2001) (examining the institutional configuration of
Community Economic Development practice).
100. DEWEY, supra note 3, at 207.
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literature of the 1960s and has since haunted the minimalists, does not appear in
the emerging experimentalist regimes. The street-level bureaucrat exercised
tacit discretion under the radar of her superiors in the broad interstices of poorly
enforced rules.101 Experimentalist design departs from the organizational fea-
tures that gave rise to the street-level bureaucrat in four important ways.
First, difficult frontline issues are more likely to be decided by a team than by
a single worker. The social professions increasingly see individual problems as
functions of multiple and diverse causes that call for interdisciplinary diagnosis
and intervention. In the most highly regarded child-protective-service programs,
the case worker’s chief responsibility is to form and periodically convene a
team that typically includes key family members, a health professional, lawyers
for the child and the state, a therapist, and perhaps a teacher.102
In schools, analogous interdisciplinary teams—the classroom teacher, the
reading specialist, and the behavioral therapist—formulate plans for students
with learning difficulties. In community policing, the precinct officers meet
regularly with community members and their representatives, school officials,
and landlord and tenant associations, among others, to determine which crimes
are currently most disruptive and threatening, and to explore ways of reconfigur-
ing public services to reduce them—perhaps rerouting a bus line to preempt
encounters between rival gangs or demolishing an abandoned house that has
become a magnet for drug dealers.
Group decision making promotes accountability in two ways. Team members
act under the gazes of a shifting array of peers. Thus, the informal pressures of
pride and shame are triggered. Furthermore, collaborative decisions require
articulation, and the fact that the team members are diverse in backgrounds
means that matters that might be taken for granted in a more homogeneous
setting have to be explained and subjected to examination.
The second feature of experimentalist service provision that distinguishes it
from street-level and other bureaucracies is a distinctive form of monitoring.
Like event-notification practices in experimentalist risk regulation, social-
services monitoring engages in intensive scrutiny of individual cases to reveal
systemic problems. But whereas event notification is triggered by unexpected
disruptions, core monitoring in experimentalist service provision is part of the
organizational routine. A particularly well-developed example is the Quality
Service Review (QSR) used in child welfare programs in Utah and several other
states. The QSR begins with selection of a stratified random sample of cases. A
two-person team, including an agency official and an outside reviewer, exam-
ines each case over two days, beginning with a file review and proceeding to
interviews with the child, family members, nonfamily caregivers, professional
team members, and others with pertinent information.
101. See MICHAEL LIPSKY, STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY: DILEMMAS OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN PUBLIC
SERVICES 3–12 (1980); JAMES Q. WILSON, VARIETIES OF POLICE BEHAVIOR 7–9 (1968).
102. See Noonan, Sabel & Simon, supra note 98, at 541–42.
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The reviewers then score the cases numerically in terms of two sets of
indicators, the first concerning “child and family status”—the wellbeing of the
child and his or her family—and the second concerning “system performance”—
the capacity to build teams, make assessments, formulate and update plans, and
execute the plans. The initial scoring is then refined in meetings among the
reviewers as a group, and then between reviewing teams and the caseworkers
and supervisors whose decisions they have reviewed. Following these clarifica-
tions, there is a second meeting to draw general conclusions and a final meeting
between reviewers and personnel from the region to discuss the systemic
significance of their findings. The final report sets out the aggregate scoring,
identifies recurring problems, and illustrates these from specific cases.
The QSR is as much a process of norm elaboration as of compliance
enforcement. Agency goals like child safety and family stability (permanence)
are, in the abstract, indeterminate. The QSR helps establish paradigmatic in-
stances of what the goals mean and how the processes should be carried out.
Participation by officials from the child welfare department’s central administra-
tion promotes consistency across regions. The integration of outsiders from
other states or consultants with national practices promotes consistency across
states. Similarly, QSR data functions as a measure of performance and as a
diagnostic tool of systemic reform. The scores can be compared over time and
(in principle though not yet in practice) across states, giving rough but service-
able indications of where attention and remedial effort should be focused.
Third, rules have a different relation to accountability in experimentalist
administration than in conventional legal thought, including in minimalism.
Workers often have discretion to depart from rules when they believe it would
be counterproductive to follow them. This discretion, however, is limited by the
requirement that a worker do so transparently in a manner that triggers review
and, if her judgment is sustained, prompt rewriting of the rule to reflect the new
understanding. These regimes challenge the premise of the street-level bureau-
cracy literature that the only escape from the rigidity of mechanical rule
following is low-visibility, ad hoc, frontline discretion.
Fourth, another important accountability mechanism in many experimentalist
regimes is coinvestment among different government and private actors. Child
welfare case planning in Utah-type regimes includes an assessment of available
“private supports.” Private supports may come from relatives, friends, churches,
and employers connected to the child’s family. They may come from institu-
tions in the community with charitable missions. Community-based housing
development grants are structured so that projects typically require the support
of multiple governmental and private institutions. Job training programs aspire to
enlist private employers in supporting and designing their curricula. From one perspec-
tive, the coinvestment practice is an extension of the team concept, further marshaling
diverse perspectives and expertise. At the same time, it serves as a check on agency
discretion. The willingness of independent institutions to invest in the plans and
projects provides some reassurance of their soundness.
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Coinvestment can also occur between the programs and their beneficiaries,
and this kind of coinvestment potentially responds to concerns about beneficiary
responsibility. Given his skepticism about complex, ongoing administrative
judgments, Ackerman favors a scheme—stakeholder grants—that is generous
upfront in a standardized way—but necessarily stingy at the back end for
individuals whose choices do not work out.103 But experimentalism makes
possible an approach that responds to needs throughout a person’s life. The
moral-hazard problems are muted because the key benefits are services that
officials and beneficiaries have jointly chosen and because the individual coin-
vests her efforts and perhaps also resources. The Utah child-welfare model, in
which parents coinvest in service plans, is an example. A more large-scale example is
the Danish “flexicurity” model that provides intensive job training and placement
services, as well as generous income support, to workers at whatever stage of their
careers that they need it. The model is controversial, but is widely credited with
neutralizing the employment disincentive effects of high benefits.104
CONCLUSION
Much current public law scholarship seems to reflect the minimalist preoccu-
pations with static optimization and administrative simplification at the expense
of experimentalist concerns with reliability and learning. At the very least, this
bias amounts to a failure of description. The number of significant, recent policy
initiatives that reflect distinctive minimalist concerns is small compared to the
number that employ unmistakably experimentalist rhetoric and architecture.
And the experimentalist initiatives have been central in a broad array of the
most pressing policy areas, including pollution, occupational safety, food safety,
policing, and nearly every major sphere of social service.
A common feature of these problems is that they arise in circumstances of
fluidity and diversity, and they call for interventions that are capable of adapta-
tion and contextualization. Interventions of the sort that minimalism tends to
favor—nudges, market simulation, rule simplification—have scant capacity for
adaptation and contextualization. By contrast, experimentalist regimes have
developed forms of nonbureaucratic administration that try to combine account-
ability with local initiative in ways that facilitate learning and individuation.
They strive for accountability less through simple rules than through peer
review of local discretion. The aspiration is that pooled learning will discipline
local autonomy while generalizing its successes. Perhaps minimalism could
accept such regimes as appropriate to categories of problems other than those
on which it has focused, but, in order to do so, it would have to soften its
resistance to frontline discretion.
103. See ACKERMAN & ALSTOTT, supra note 2, at 39–40.
104. See Torben M. Anderson & Michael Svarer, Flexicurity—Labour Market Performance in
Denmark, 53 CESIFO ECON. STUD. 389, 389–93, 421–24 (2007).
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